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καὶ µὴ ϕοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεννόντων τὸ σῶµα,
τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν µὴ δυναµένων ἀποκτεῖναι ·
ϕοβεῖσθε δὲ µᾶλλον τὸν δυνάµενον
καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα ἀπολέσαι
ἐν γεέννῃ.
-ΚΑΤΑ ΜΑΘΘΑΙΟΝ 10:28

(And fear not them which kill the body,
but are not able to kill the soul:
but rather fear Him which is able
to destroy both soul and body
in hell.)
-Matthew 10:28 (KJV)
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Abstract
In contemporary metaphysics, there are two popular options for personal numerical
identity (NID) over time: substance dualism and materialism. According to recent arguments by
some Christian philosophers, both options conflict with the Christian doctrine of the bodily
resurrection. Substance dualism trivializes the physical body for NID (when it has some kind of
role in the bodily resurrection), and also is seen to conflict with modern neuroscience. But NID
and mind cannot be continued solely by the material body, as versions of the Replacement
Argument (from Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga) show. There are good aspects to both
options, especially with regard to the bodily resurrection. Is there a way to reconcile them?
In this thesis I have two motivating big questions: 1) Can the conflict between Christian
substance dualists and materialists be resolved by the hylomorphic Aristotelian model of human
personhood proposed by Eleonore Stump, based on her interpretation of Thomas Aquinas (the
Stump/Aquinas model)? 2) Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome metaphysical challenges
against numerical identity and the bodily resurrection? I argue that the Stump/Aquinas model
accommodates the conflict between Christian dualists and materialists by identifying human
persons with both the physical body and the immaterial mind as a single-substance composite. If
we think of the disembodied state as a ‘data backup’ and couple the medieval solutions with
contemporary terminology, then the Stump/Aquinas model overcomes most of the metaphysical
challenges it faces. But, the model ultimately requires a modification to answer the second big
question. DNA (as genome or immaterial information) is the configured configurer and part of
Aquinas’s original concept of the soul as the Aristotelian form of the body. In light of its
explanatory power and compatibility with Aquinas’ thought, I argue the Stump/Aquinas model,
modified with DNA, is a strong contender for a robust philosophical-theological anthropology.
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Chapter One

Introduction: Two Big Questions

Imagine a person, P –we will call him Paul. According to the debate in contemporary
metaphysics, it seems we have two majority and popular options to account for his personal
numerical identity. If substance dualism is true, then Paul is two separate substances (a soul/mind
and a body), and he is numerically identified only with the immaterial aspect of himself (the
soul/mind). If materialism is true, then Paul is one substance (a physical body made of atoms),
numerically identified with only his body, and the things historically attributed to the immaterial
soul (intellect, volition, sensation, memory, personality, consciousness, etc.) are products of his
neurological and biochemical processes.
According to recent arguments made by some Christian philosophers, both of the above
options have problems in the face of the Christian doctrine of the bodily resurrection.1 Under
substance dualism, the materialists argue, Paul’s physical body is trivial to his resurrection. They
say dualism is in conflict, since the bodily resurrection assigns at least some sort of role to Paul’s
body for personal identity. Materialists also say dualism conflicts with everyday experience,
especially given the scientific advances made in knowledge of the human body and brain. But
under materialism, the substance dualists argue, Paul’s body cannot be the sole bearer of his
personal identity, because of the problems related to Ship of Theseus type puzzles for material
1
In this thesis, let the bodily resurrection be such that Paul will be –must be– numerically identical with his predeath self; his individual essence (whether in the body or in the soul/mind) must survive his death and must continue
his personal numerical identity between death and resurrection. Te very nature of the issue in question is centered on
the problem of personal numerical identity and the bodily resurrection, as a question of philosophical theology.
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objects. Beyond that, the dualists argue it is far from intuitive to say mental content is identical to
states in the material brain –and mental content should not be what personal identity reduces to,
in the first place.2 It appears both dualists and materialists have the upper hand in regard to
explaining the bodily resurrection of the dead and continuity over time of numerical personal
identity! Is this conflict irresolvable or can we mediate between the good points that both dualists
and materialists make with respect to the resurrection and identity of persons? We are left with a
quandary, and a stalemate regarding poor Paul’s identity, and our own. Who and what is he?
What are we?
But what if, instead of being numerically identified with only his material body, or only
his immaterial soul/mind, Paul is identified with both, as a substantial composite? Instead of the
two parts being separate substances, what if the union or composite of Paul is a single substance?
And what if, instead of the form of Paul having nothing to do with his body, Paul’s essence or
soul in-formed (and en-formed) the material composite –so that what is necessary for Paul’s
identity could be ‘backed up’ like computer data? It would mean his identity remains constant,
and his body is not the seat of his identity, but is properly part of his identity. Could it work?
In this thesis I have two motivating ‘big questions’, the second following from the
consequences of the first. 1) Can the apparent conflict between Christian substance dualists and
materialists be resolved by the hylomorphic Aristotelian understanding of human personhood
proposed by Eleonore Stump, based on her interpretation of Thomas Aquinas (hereafter termed
the ‘Stump/Aquinas model’)?3 2) Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome the many
2

These two items, for example, comprise Alvin Plantinga’s two main arguments in “Against Materialism,” Faith
and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (Jan 2006): 3-32 and “Materialism and Christian Belief,” in Persons: Human and Divine,
Edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 99-141.
3

See Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism," Faith and
Philosophy 12, no. 4 (October 1995): 505-31; and Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003). As to the name I am
assigning: Stump, in Aquinas, 212, admits that Aquinas is some kind of dualist "since he thinks that there is an
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metaphysical challenges surrounding numerical identity and the bodily resurrection (which is at
the heart of the aforementioned conflict)? I will argue that the Stump/Aquinas model
accommodates almost all of the conflicts between Christian dualists and materialists, but it
requires a modification as an answer to the second ‘big question’: DNA as Stump’s ‘configured
configurer’ rightly viewed as part of Aquinas’s original concept of an in-forming4 esse or soul. In
light of its explanatory power and compatibility with Aquinas’s thought, I will argue that the
Stump/Aquinas model, so modified with DNA, is a strong contender for a robust philosophicaltheological anthropology.
I will introduce the first question by briefly framing in this introduction what dualism
requires of the Stump/Aquinas model, via Plantinga’s and Swinburne’s versions of the
Replacement Argument. This will lead to the topic of chapter two: the Stump/Aquinas model,
sectioned into succinct statements that are readily found among the defenders of the model.
Among them: Aristotle’s four causes at the forefront in order to think within Aquinas’s
metaphysical context about the soul (the most important of the four causes being formal cause);
Boethius’s definition of a person, “an individual substance with a rational nature,” to show that

immaterial and subsistent constituent of the subject of cognitive function." In “Non-Cartesian,” 520, Stump coins
“subsistence dualism,” which is certainly an option, though it fails to capture the hard distinction between Aquinas's
view and Descartes'. Regarding the careful way Stump and Aquinas deal with the intellective aspect of a person,
‘emergence’ fits to an extent (and Stump has a brief discussion of ‘substance’ as an emergent thing in Aquinas
Chapters 1 and 6). However, the different shade of meaning for ‘emergent’ in William Hasker’s context rules it out.
‘Hylomorphism’ is an option, but because Aquinas is not considered a thoroughgoing hylomorphist, and he modifies
Aristotle’s metaphysics heavily, it does not seem to work, either. ‘Composite dualism’ or ‘compound dualism’ may
fit, and both have been used recently in the literature –and rightly so: the view can be properly classified as dualism
to the extent that Aquinas holds to a disembodied state distinct from Plato’s or Descartes’. However, to be safe, I am
calling it the ‘Stump/Aquinas model’, to go more along the lines of Hud Hudson’s coining, “whatever it is that
Aquinas is.” Hud Hudson, “I Am Not An Animal!” in Persons: Human and Divine, Edited by Peter van Inwagen
and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 220-21.
4

Throughout the thesis, I will be borrowing this nuanced understanding of “inform” or “information” and
emphasizing the double-meaning by hyphenating the term where necessary. Although I can attest that I came upon
this novel way of using words entirely independent of my reading, for what seems to be the original usage of that
turn of phrase, see Marjorie Grene, “Aristotle and Modern Biology,” Journal of the History of Ideas Vol. 33, no. 3,
Festrschrift for Philip P. Wiemer (Jul-Sep 1972): 412, where she says, “Thus in the code case or in physiological
explanation, the problem-location, the description and the explanation all refer to form: information.”

4
immaterial minds expressed in a material composite reflects the metaphysically amphibious
nature of human beings; the soul as configured configurer, unique as the only kind of form that
survives and subsists from the matter it in-forms; and the criteria for what a ‘substance’ is for
Stump/Aquinas, to show the separate soul is not a substance by itself, and thus distinguishing the
model from substance dualism. This will all go toward answering the first ‘big question.’
Then, in chapter three, I will argue the Stump/Aquinas model answers Plantinga in the
affirmative, “Does Paul exist when his body does not?” by way of (C ≠ ID): For Paul’s
numerical identity, disembodied and resurrected, Constitution is not Identity. I will introduce the
‘data backup’ analogy (via John Polkinghorne’s information-bearing pattern) to give more clarity
to the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state. Ambiguities many identify concerning Stump/Aquinas
and the intellect or mind can be resolved with (D ≠ ID): Relating between the brain and mental
states, Dependence is Not Identity. With brain localization as a potential weak spot, I will show
that Stump/Aquinas can –with D ≠ ID and a conception of the mind ‘backed up’ along with the
configured configurer– include the findings of modern neuroscience (and therefore the
materialists’ big reason for holding their view). However, even with the two above axioms, there
are resulting metaphysical challenges concerning the ambiguity of ‘form’ and the resulting
problem of numerical identity (NID) for the bodily resurrection. It will seem, as a result, that the
Stump/Aquinas soul must be understood as a µορϕη part and a νους part in one unqualified soul.
This will result in a conflict that makes it necessary to modify Stump/Aquinas.
So, in chapter four I will introduce a modification to the model: the immaterial
information, or genome, of Paul’s DNA is the ‘configured configurer’. I will argue why DNA
needs to be included within the model, how it accommodates many other problems, and how
objections to it may be overcome. I show Paul’s numerical identity cannot be merely his DNA,
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because of the problems arising with his identical twin Raul. This means splitting the rational
soul between DNA as ‘configured configurer’, and the traditional understanding of the
psychological self that survives death (what I will call, strictly for the purposes of this thesis, the
Seele-νους), both ‘backed up’ as immaterial information. So I will show Paul’s teleological inform-ation, as both DNA and Seele-νους, is sufficient for a solution to the problem of personal
numerical identity for the resurrection. Finally, in chapter five, I will address any remaining
objections or logical loose ends and then show step-by-step what Paul’s resurrection entails
under the Stump/Aquinas model. Throughout, I hope to defend the concept of ‘soul’ while also
upholding the importance of the physical body, in order to navigate the treacherous waters of
identity of persons, toward a more coherent Christian metaphysic of the bodily resurrection.

The Requirement from Dualism: the Replacement Argument
Before I can present the case for the Stump/Aquinas model, I must call brief attention to
the arguments presented in favor of dualism/immaterialism by Swinburne and Plantinga, in order
to determine what seems irrefutable and necessary. Substance dualism has been an accepted view
of metaphysical personhood within classical Christianity, and is perhaps the current majority
view. It is also a notable philosophical view, with Plato and Descartes commonly seen as its most
famous defenders. Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne share one argument (among others)
for substance dualism upon similar merits as the historical iteration: an argument based upon a
thought experiment dealing with the replacement of Plantinga’s body parts, or brain, while he
retains his identity, the Replacement Argument. This argument serves as a potential stumbling
block for anyone arguing for personal identity linked solely to the material body. It therefore sets
up some requirements that the Stump/Aquinas model must fulfill.

6
Swinburne’s statement and defense of it is a recent well-known version, and he notably
defends dualism within contemporary analytic philosophy. Because he denies any triviality of
the physical body, Swinburne considers his position to be more like “soft dualism.”5 He still
centers the compelling call for dualism on the intuition that there is “more to me than the matter
of which my body and brain are made, a further essential non-physical part whose continuing
existence makes the brain (and so body) to which it is connected my brain (and body) and to this
something I give the traditional name of ‘soul’.”6 Soul, for Swinburne, is “pure mental
substance,”7 and the understanding of the existence of this substance comes as a result of
considering Swinburne’s version of the Replacement problem, the Brain State Transfer thought
experiement (BST). It starts with the brain, since it seems right that Paul’s identity would
continue if he lost his arm or foot, but the brain is a special consideration.8 So, the thought
experiment of Paul having both hemispheres of his brain removed and implanted into two
separate bodies poses a problem: which one is Paul? Whereas in Bernard Williams’s famous
“mad surgeon dilemma,” Paul would be forced to choose which of his ‘selves’ survives or dies,
Swinburne points out some intangible qualities of personal identity –namely, free will and self
realization–that seem absurd to think of continuing in part. If Paul can continue with some other
matter (a different body, perhaps), then Paul’s matter is not essential to his personal identity at
all, and so no matter is essential to Paul.9 Furthermore, it seems if Paul were to consciously
experience and remember within one body/brain on even days, and then swap his memory,

5

Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of The Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10.

6

Richard Swinburne, Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 198.

7

Ibid, 199.

8

Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 147ff.

9

Ibid, 153; Existence of God, 197-98.
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consciousness and character (without a physical brain transplant) to another body on odd days,
the material body would have little to do at all with Paul’s personal identity.10 This is why, when
it comes to identity of human persons, Swinburne favors a shift from a strict Aristotelian account
of material identity toward a modified account –where what constitutes personal identity is
indivisible and simple, and not based upon its materials.11 He thinks classical substance dualism
more simply expresses this view, rather than Aquinas’s modifying Aristotle’s soft materialism.
Alvin Plantinga has recently argued strongly for dualism, with the explicit claim,
“Materialism goes contrary to the Christian tradition; even worse (so I’ll argue), it is false. As I
see it, therefore, Christian philosophers ought to be dualists …Finally, certain crucial Christian
doctrines (for example, Incarnation and the resurrection of the dead) fit better –much better, I’d
say—with dualism than with materialism.”12 Plantinga’s conviction rests upon his versions of the
Replacement argument, all iterations of which require the statement, ”It is possible that: the cells
in B are replaced by other cells and the originals instantly annihilated while I continue to exist;
and the replacement time for B and those cells is shorter than the assimilation time.”13 The
strategy parallels Swinburne’s: show how personal identity is not at all contingent upon the
physical body. Plantinga has two versions of the argument: the macroscopic and microscopic.
The macroscopic argument shows the logical possibility for all parts of Paul’s body (B) to be
replaced, and the original parts annihilated, over a time as short as a microsecond. Thus, B would
no longer exist, but Paul would. This is even true of the brain, which Plantinga says could have

10

Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 166.

11

Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 29-33; and The
Evolution of the Soul, 154, called the “quasi-Aristotelian assumption.”
12

13

Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 99-100.

Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 6. Also on p. 4, “It seems possible that I continue to exist when B, my body,
does not. I therefore have the property possibly exists when B does not. B, however, clearly lacks that property.”
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its contents transferred from one hemisphere to another, and the brain could be replaced by allnew material, one hemisphere at a time.14 In the microscopic argument, Plantinga argues for the
logical possibility of Paul’s body being replaced at the level of atoms, molecules, or cells. This
would again be in a very brief amount of time, all while Paul remains conscious.15 The
microscopic version is, save for the brief amount of time posited for the replacement to take
place, actually more true to life: all of the matter composing Paul’s body is cyclically replaced
every few years (and the matter composing the brain is actually replaced every two months).16
So, from pure logical possibility, it seems right to say Paul continues to exist over the brief time
it takes to replace the parts of B –even his brain hemispheres– either by chunks or by tiny bits. If
this holds, it would mean Paul’s personal identity is not his body, so Paul is not his body.
So, the requirement given to Stump/Aquinas from substance dualism is plain: Paul cannot
be numerically identified with solely his material body. But due to the bodily resurrection, the
physical body has at least some role in personal identity. This tension means, at least, keeping in
mind the conclusions of Swinburne’s BST thought experiments and Plantinga’s Replacement
Arguments. While holding this tension, we must show: 1) how the Stump/Aquinas model is still
distinct from substance dualism; 2) how Paul’s soul is numerically identical to him when it is
disembodied; 3) how substantial form (the soul) can be responsible for mental states and
configuring matter in the Aristotelian sense. With the unique way the Stump/Aquinas model
accounts for metaphysical categories, information, material constitution and mind, I will argue in
the next three chapters that the DNA-modified Stump/Aquinas model is compatible with this
requirement from dualism while still meeting almost all of the other challenges it faces.
14

Ibid, 4- 5.

15

Ibid, 5-6.

16

Plantinga, “Materialism and Christian Belief,” 104.
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Chapter Two

Ancient and Medieval Background: The Stump/Aquinas Model

At resurrection, our subject, Paul, is in the middle of the dualist-materialist conflict.
Given the various iterations of the Replacement Argument (RA), Paul’s numerical identity
cannot be comprised simply of his material body. But, given the bodily resurrection, Paul should
be somehow identified with his material body, since upon being resurrected Paul will be a body
again, and it is promised to be quite like his old one, to say the least. The Stump/Aquinas model,
with Paul as an in-formed material composite, bridges the conflict over the resurrection between
dualists and materialists. Admittedly, the goal of a golden mean between them (or a strategy to
incorporate the good parts from both), is an elusive prize, and therefore a popular target. What
makes the Stump/Aquinas model an attractive possibility is its resilience against a traditional
label, mainly due to its flexibility to incorporate truths from seemingly contradictory views.
Namely: the Stump/Aquinas non-Cartesian dualism is consistent with RA, and consistent with
observations raised by Christian materialists17 regarding the relation of brain states to mental
states, and the bodily resurrection. The modification I offer via DNA to meet the challenge of the
criterion of personal numerical identity can be affirmed consistently only by a composite

17

The most paradigmatic of whom are Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist
Alternative to the Soul, (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006); Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A
Constitution View, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990), among others.
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position: dualism or materialism would have to capitulate on important points, and essentially
take on aspects of the Stump/Aquinas model to support DNA. Here, I am only seeking to show
how the Stump/Aquinas model could satisfy the conditions for both sides –I do not hope to solve
the problem outright. Still, getting from A to B –to Ω– will take some background information.
For our purposes, the most important advocates of the Stump/Aquinas model are
Eleonore Stump,18 Christina van Dyke,19 and Jason T. Eberl.20 They thoroughly cite and defend
Aquinas’s position, and each support Stump’s interpretation in order to rise to contemporary
challenges relying on Aristotelian categories. As I see it, there are six statements of the model, to
which I will refer: (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form; (B)
Boethius defines a person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians; (CC) Configured
configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’; (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied:
Human persons are one composite material substance and not two substances; (C ≠ ID) For
Paul’s disembodied NID, Constitution is not Identity; (D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental
states, Dependence is Not Identity. For reference and clarity, I will discuss and define the first
four statements of the model, and thoroughly cite affirmations of them, in this chapter. For better
organization, and because of the pack of metaphysical quandaries that accompany them, I will
save the discussion of the last two statements for the next chapter. Along the way I will offer
brief exposition, including answers to the requirement from dualism, and answers to other
objections to the Stump/Aquinas model.
18

In “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism”; and Aquinas; and
“Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul.” in Die menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den
Dualismus? Edited by Bruno Niederbacher and Edmund Runggaldier (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2006), 151-172.
19

In Christina van Dyke, “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability:
Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 (2007) 373-94; and “Not Properly a Person: The
Rational Soul and Thomistic Substance Dualism.” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 2 (April 2009): 186-204.
20

Mostly in Jason T. Eberl, “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” The Review of Metaphysics 58, no. 2
(Dec. 2004), 333-365.
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I. (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form
According to Stump, Aquinas’s metaphysics relies upon Aristotelian categories, and
therefore his view of soul radically differs from what can be considered a common or Platonic
view, which Aquinas sums up as a “motor” within the body.21 Many people today still think of
Paul’s soul, then, as a wispy spirit-form that floats away from him upon his death, much like a
ghost. Christians who hold this view of the soul will, of course, be influenced by it in their
understanding of the resurrection. But for Aquinas, this view of the soul is not the case at all: for
him, and for us here, ‘soul’ is the generic term for a substantial form22 of a living material object.
In the Stump/Aquinas model, the concept of ‘form’ comes about as a result of Aquinas’s theory
of things, or that which is a hoc aliquid (as opposed to a res, a word for ‘things’ more related to
his ontology or theory of what there is).23 Some hoc aliquids are material, and some are not, like
angels. Each material thing has a form that configures matter. Form is the actuality of a hoc
aliquid, and configuration/organization is necessary for existence.24
For the Stump/Aquinas concept of ‘form’, it is helpful to recall some basic information in
Aristotle’s four causes (αἰτίαι τέτταρες)25: material cause (ὕλη), the stuff of which a substance

21

See Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 506-7, and Summa theologiae (ST) Ia.76.a1, a3, a6, and a8.

22

Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 511. A ‘substantial form’ is “form in virtue of which a material composite is a member
of the species to which it belongs, and it configures prime matter.” Stump, Aquinas, 194. It is distinct from
‘accidental form’ in the same way that substance as a category of being is distinct from accidental properties.
Substantial forms configure prime matter only, whereas, for example, artifacts are a conglomeration of parts (each
configured by substantial forms), and the artifact itself is configured from the top by an accidental form. Stump,
Aquinas, 42-3.
23
See van Dyke, “Not Properly a Person,” 191, footnote 26, where ‘hoc aliquid’ is for Aquinas the term for
Aristotle’s τοδε τι or ‘particular substance’. In Stump, Aquinas, 35 and the footnotes on 481, hoc aliquid can be
considered either a substance or a part of a substance (as in the case of a dismembered hand). More concerning
‘substance’ will be presented in statement (DDD), below.
24

25

Stump, Aquinas, 37. Here Stump cites De principiis naturae (DPN ) 1 (340).

See Aristotle, Physics Book II, Chs. 3-7 (194b 16-195b 30); Metaphysics Book IV, Ch. 2 (1013a 24-1014a 25);
Generation of Animals Book I, Ch.1 (715a 3-6).
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(οὐσία) is made; efficient cause (ἀρχἠ της κινήσεως), the principle of motion/change/activity in a
thing; formal cause (µορϕη), the “λογος of the thing’s essence,”26 or better yet, the plan or
blueprint which configures the thing; and final cause (τελος), the end or purpose of a thing. So,
Aquinas’s understands Paul’s soul as the Aristotelian µορϕη of his ὕλη body, and they are a
single composite –thus, hylo-morphism27 (ὕλη and µορϕη). A thing’s µορϕη in-forms it into the
thing it is. Aristotle provides a statement of the four causes’ relationship to man:
What is the material cause of a man? The menses. What is the moving cause? The
semen. What is the formal cause? The essence. What is the final cause? The end. (But
perhaps both the latter are the same.) We must, however, state the most proximate
causes. What is the matter? Not fire or earth, but the matter proper to man.28
Aristotle provides this short anthropological statement more as an example to ask about the
biological formation of a person (thus the semen as the efficient cause, when obviously there are
other causes that explain motion in a living, functioning grown human being). The ideas may
seem odd at first, but perhaps not. The καταµηνια or “menses” as the material cause is not so farfetched considering the Greek understanding of embryonic development. As the formal cause, he
uses the term ‘το τι εν ειναι’ to describe ‘essence,’ which Aquinas analogously takes to be the
Latin esse. In that vein, Aristotle’s idea of the soul as a formal cause in-forming a composite is
crucial to understanding Aquinas’s ‘soul.’ The Greek ideas were carried over in Aquinas’s
reading of the text, and are therefore important in uncovering these vital categories.
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Thus, following Aristotle’s breakdown in De Anima (II.4 through III.6), for Aquinas,
every animate or living thing has a soul, “the first principle of life in things that live among us.”29
Stump points out the Latin word for soul (anima) is Aquinas’s generic term for the substantial
form of any living material object, and the human soul “is the substantial form constituting the
material substance that a human being is, and it configured matter, as material forms do.”30 So
plants have a nutritive soul, and animals a nutritive/sensitive soul, both kinds of which go out of
existence at death. But human souls are a unity of the nutritive/sensitive/rational. So, we are not
referring to three separate forms or souls, but rather one soul fulfilling all three roles. For the
Stump/Aquinas model, then, the human soul is responsible for: 1) the essence of a human being;
2) the actualization of matter composing it; and 3) the unity of existence and activity in it.31
These broad categories will be focused below, especially in statements (DDD) and (C ≠ ID), but
this suffices to lay a foundation for the hylomorphic view.
As Swinburne understands it, Aquinas takes Aristotle’s oft-cited maxim “the soul is the
form of the body” and modifies it to proclaim the human soul is the only form able to exist apart
from its matter. That form, though, is only capable of informing the unique body (or brain) for
the expression of a particular human soul.32 So, souls for Swinburne are not only different in
rational/epistemic structure, but should be different in “soul-stuff,” a category unrecognized by
Aquinas.33 In broader terms, Swinburne argues that because persons are substances, and because
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they cannot be reduced to their Replacement-prone material stuff, they must be made of
immaterial stuff, which is indivisible, which is the soul.34 He therefore says Aquinas’s system
elaborately modifies Aristotle’s ‘form’. Classical dualism does something just as sweeping in
positing immaterial substance as a second kind, and is not tied to keeping neat the connections to
Aristotle’s system. Swinburne prefers classical dualism –though even he sees benefits in
Aquinas, “for example, it enables him to bring out the naturalness of a person being embodied
and the temporary and transitory character of any disembodiment.”35 But, while his observations
are accurate, it seems Swinburne’s argument against Aquinas’s Aristotelian framework on forms
and hoc aliquids is rather ad hoc. If we can demonstrate that modifying Aristotle is more cogent
in some ways than Swinburne’s preference for classical dualism (if, for example, Stump/Aquinas
can accommodate DNA in a way Swinburne’s cannot), then so much the better for Aquinas.36 It
may be he felt he said everything necessary concerning Aquinas’s view in Personal Identity, and
various places in The Evolution of the Soul. But if that is the case, we are left only with a
preference for distinct kinds of stuff instead of formal causes, for practicality’s sake.
Swinburne’s reservations about Aquinas’s model are well-noted, but are minor caveats against
relying upon Aquinas’s Aristotelian ways and means, rather than defeaters.
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II. (B) Boethius’s definition of person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians
The defenders of the Stump/Aquinas model show Aquinas consistently holds to
Boethius’s definition of a person, “an individual substance with a rational nature.”37 (A ‘nature’
is just a collection of species-specific properties.) This definition upholds the existence of
spiritual beings like angels (which are substantial forms not configuring matter), and God, who is
pure form.38 Given this definition of a person, the definition of a human person becomes a bit
more complex: Aquinas says, “the word ‘person’ denotes ‘this flesh and these bones and this
soul, which are the principles that individuate a human being, and indeed which, although they
do not belong to the signification of ‘person,’ do belong to the signification of ‘human person’
(humanae personae).”39
This puts human persons of the genus ‘rational animal’ in an odd place. As Stump
explains, Aquinas’s thought contains an ontological hierarchy. At the top are God and the angels,
forms not configuring matter (with God as pure act). At the bottom are forms configuring matter
but unable to subsist apart from the material composites they in-form, like rocks and trees, tables
and chairs. Human persons are uniquely in the middle of this hierarchy as “metaphysical
amphibians,”40 whose souls as substantial forms come into existence only with the material
composite they configure. The human soul is the highest kind of form configuring material
objects, and the lowest kind of form able to subsist separate from matter. Stump observes,
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“Consequently, in the ranking of forms, the human soul is located right at the boundary between
the material and the spiritual.”41
Human beings have a material nature as rational animals,42 and though the very definition
of ‘person’ for Aquinas does not entail immateriality, the definition does include it.43
Furthermore, as Eberl says, “A human being is not merely an aggregate of body and soul. A
material human body and its substantial form are metaphysically distinct, but neither of them
alone is a substance.”44 Again, because the configurational form (µορϕη) comes into existence
only along with its matter (ὕλη) in the body, humanae personae as ‘metaphysical amphibians’
are composites. Stump says “[Aquinas] takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or
configurational but nonetheless realized in material components.”45 When placed within the
context of Aristotelian form and Boethius’s definition, Aquinas’s understanding of the soul so far
is: the soul is the (Aristotelian) form of the body, and a human being is a composite of the two,
which is material, and therefore a human being as rational animal is an immaterial intellective
mind expressed by an in-formed material body.46 We are led, then, directly to the next statement
of the Stump/Aquinas model, the ‘configured configurer.’
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III. (CC) Configured configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’
Aquinas views the soul as configured/created directly by God and fused into the matter of
the body. Because Paul is, like all of us, a “metaphysical amphibian,” his substantial form (soul)
has a double (backward-and-forward) causal aspect: of God creating it directly as an individual
thing and also the soul itself configuring or in-form the material composite that makes up Paul,
just like the substantial form of other particular things or hoc aliquids. As Stump says, “For
Aquinas, to be is to be configured.”47 A form organizes and configures a thing, including its
causal relations both dynamic (substantial) and static (accidental).48 Stump’s uniquely
contributes to Aquinas’s understanding of form, and how it relates to the human being: “Like the
angels, the human soul is itself configured [by God]; but like the forms of other material things,
the human soul has the ability to configure matter [of the body]. The human soul, then, is a
configured configurer.”49 All material objects are what they are in virtue of their substantial
form. As the substantial form of the human body, the soul in-forms the way the person (the
material composite) is organized for each particular case.
The connection reveals itself the further Stump goes into demonstrating Aquinas’s views
on form. A macro-level object can be configured on different levels, and she gives the example
of the CAT/Enhancer-Binding Protein (C/EBP).50 In its active form, the C/EBP molecule is a
dimer with an alpha helix coil. C/EBP can be gradually reduced in layers of complexity and
configuration from the configured whole, to dimer subunits, to amino acids making up those
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subunits, to compounds making the amino acids, to periodic elements making up the compounds,
to protons within each elemental atom, even down to quarks within the protons, until we get to
prime matter, which is indivisible, potential and conceptual according to Aquinas. Just as those
steps of configuration come together to make C/EBP, the soul is “what makes that matter not
only a human body but in fact this living human body.”51 Whereas C/EBP and other material
things like rocks and trees only have forms that configure the matter, the substantial form of
human persons (the soul) is in this in-between state, “metaphysical amphibian”: the soul actively
configures a substantial composite, uniquely rational among created things. Coupling C/EBP
with Aquinas’s view of the soul as the configuring form of the matter of all living things,
‘configured configurer’ becomes a powerful way of explaining the hylomorphic relationship
between ὕλη and µορϕη in living things, particularly in individual human persons.52
This means, significantly, the substantial form of human persons as soul is more than just
a mind or νους. Christina van Dyke says: “The rational soul is not just responsible for abstract
thought, in other words– it’s also responsible for our toenails growing, our livers filtering toxins
from our blood, and our hearing the alarm clock go off in the morning. Our bodies cannot
function in separation from our souls.”53 Paul’s soul, then, literally is a configurational state of
the materials making up his body, or the organization of the matter he would need to give his
body its species-specific causal powers.54 His soul, furthermore, is unique to his in-formed
matter; there is just one substantial form configuring the matter into being the rational animate
51
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material composite of Paul. Paul’s soul begins existence only with its composite, the body –not
before it.55 Notably, this configurational state is alone not sufficient to qualify as a substance,
which poses a considerable metaphysical difficulty that needs to be addressed. Eberl says, “As
configured, a human soul subsists with its own individual set of qualities. However, as a
configurer, that is, as the substantial form of a material body, a human soul does not subsist with
a complete specific nature. A soul alone is not identical to a human being, nor has it a complete
human nature.”56 This, of course, leads to the next statement concerning Descartes’ dualism.

IV. (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied: Human persons are one composite material
substance and not two substances
Aquinas forcefully rejects anything like Cartesian dualism –including Platonic dualism:
Accordingly, Plato and his followers asserted that the intellectual soul is not united to
the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for Plato said that the soul
is in the body ‘as a sailor in a ship.’57…But this doctrine seems not to fit the facts.
For, as a result of contact of power, a thing unqualifiedly one does not arise, as we
have shown; whereas from the union of soul and body there results a man. On Plato’s
theory, then, a man is not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor consequently, is he a being
unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by accident. In order to avoid this, Plato asserted
[In Alcibades, 129E, 130C] that man is not a being composed of body and soul, but
that the soul itself using the body is man; just as Peter is not a thing composed of man
and clothes, but a man using clothes. This, however, is shown to be impossible.58
Stump shows that Aquinas elsewhere, as well, anticipates the Cartesian position, well-known
from Plato, and rejects it.59 This means for Aquinas –contra substance dualism as commonly
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held– Paul is not merely a soul; he is not numerically identified with only his soul. Aquinas says,
“The soul is part of the human species; for this reason, since it is still by nature unitable [to a
body] even when it is separated, it cannot be the sort of individual substance which is called a
‘hypostasis’ or ‘first substance’ any more than a hand or any other part of a human being can.
And so neither the name nor the definition of ‘person’ belongs to the rational soul.”60 Since,
then, we are not seeking to identify a human person solely with their immaterial aspect, there
remains a large gap of explanation for the Stump/Aquinas model to fill. Aquinas views the soul
as the substantial form of the human being (as a matter/form, or body/soul, or ὕλη/µορϕη
composite); the person is one in-formed material substance and not two. It is on this interpretive
point where substance dualists, like Plantinga, have disagreed: “There is also the important but
obscure view of Thomas Aquinas and his followers. Is this a form of dualism? The question is
vexed. According to Aquinas, a human person is a material substance with an immaterial part,
the soul. Aquinas says, of this immaterial part, that it is itself a substance.” 61 But Aquinas
clearly says, “body and soul are not two actually existing substances; rather, the two of them
together constitute one actually existing substance.”62 Because of the difficultly concerning
Aquinas’s meaning of ‘substance’ and ‘part’, Paul’s unity as a human person, according to van
Dyke, “would be seriously undermined if both body and soul were independent substances.”63
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An extremely important question arises: what exactly does the Stump/Aquinas model
mean by ‘substance’? Which among the metaphysical things that Aquinas reifies are properly
called ‘things’? A foundational question of philosophy lurks, “What is being?” which converges
on the question “What is human being?” In order to deny Descartes’ dualism, we need to get a
grip on the Stump/Aquinas view of ‘substance’. The task certainly cannot be completed (or the
surface of it barely scratched) here. Aristotle himself recognized “the question which was raised
formerly and is raised now and always, and which always causes difficulty, is what being is; and
this is the question what substance is.”64 It is necessary, though, to nail down a short framework,
in order to call upon the ideas with some familiarity.
Recall from statement (A) that a form (µορϕη) for Aquinas is that which in-forms the
matter into the composite. A composite is the only sort of thing which is a ‘particular thing’ or
individual substance or hoc aliquid in the proper sense. For human persons, the soul is the form
of their material hylomorphic composite. Therefore, the soul (as form) “is precisely the actuality
whereby the body has life,”65 –it is the act of the body, and the body is only potential with
respect to the soul, and the compound human being is the thing that is alive.66 For all things,
Stump points out that each form is the actuality of a hoc aliquid, and its configuration or
organization by such a form is necessary for its existence.67 A hoc aliquid must be complete in
being and kind, and so cannot just be either the form or the matter by itself; something must be a
composite to be considered a hoc aliquid. In other words, matter is potential being, form is
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‘entelechy’ (i.e. the actuality rendering the matter actual), and a composite of the form and
matter is the resulting actual thing which is properly a substance.68
So: ‘substance’ is the “primary kind of being”69 that, according to Aristotle, indicates the
whatness of a thing (‘whatness in Latin being “quiddity,” as opposed to quantity or quality,
affection, or other sort of accidental property, which are categories of being but not substance).
Substance is ‘being’ in an unqualified sense, rather than a special sense; things that are qualities
or have connection with a substance are not themselves substances.70 Aristotle points out there
are four things ‘substance’ can be used to denote: 1) essence, or again quiddity/’whatness’; 2)
universal or abstract thing; 3) a genus (a way of classifying particular things); 4) and a subject,
that of which the other three are predicated. (A subject, here, is a particular thing, or again a hoc
aliquid.) It is this fourth use in which we are interested for the Stump/Aquinas model. Substance,
then, is “not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which all other things are predicated.”71
Hence, a substance in our sense can be considered the subject, on the receiving end of any
qualifying (accidental) property. And although the ability to receive accidental properties is not
itself enough to satisfy a proper definition of ‘substance’, it is a good start.
Along those lines, Aristotle says two things “belong chiefly to substance” as subject: 1)
to exist separately, and 2) to be a particular thing. But an individual substance/particular
thing/hoc aliquid, for Aquinas, is not necessarily something complete in its being and kind. So
the definition of ‘substance’, over and above ‘particular thing’, ought to be complete without
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reference to anything else. Aquinas says, “every substance is defined in terms merely of its
material and formal principles.”72 Stump points out this definition requirement could be a third
condition for ‘substance’ if it were not for the resulting tricky circularity: i.e. it could be only
complete things have substantial forms, but the fact that substantial forms are had only by
substances is only itself by definition.73 Aquinas himself mirrors Aristotle’s two conditions for
‘substance’ in QDA 1, but makes a qualification to distinguish it from his understanding of hoc
aliquids: 1) independent existence, and 2) complete in species and genus.74 Though Aquinas
does refer to the soul as ‘substance’ in a loose, non-technical sense, the soul only meets the first
criterion, since only composites are complete in species and genus and thus a substance.75
In regards to the question of how the Stump/Aquinas model is distinct from Cartesian
dualism, the formal cause (including a human soul) of a thing is not itself a substance, because
some hoc aliquids can exist on their own, though they are not substances. Stump points out,
“…at best, for Aquinas, the ability to exist on its own is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for something’s being a substance.”76 So, things like dismembered hands and disembodied souls
are hoc aliquids, but not substances because they are not complete things in their own right. They
can be defined only in relation to something else (namely the composite human being, which is a
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substance).77 Within a substantial form, the elements making up the composite shed their own
particular substantial forms, and there is only one substantial form for a composite. A material
substance, then, is prime matter configured by a substantial form, and the constituent things
within it are parts (without their own substantial forms) of that composite. Stump says it may be
more helpful to think of ‘substance’ as emergent with respect to parts; the parts lose their own
forms in constituting the whole. 78 However, we can divide composites into parts, and one
substance into several substances. Stump examines it like this:
…although accounts of emergentism are typically couched in terms of emergent
properties, on Aquinas’s way of thinking about material objects what can emerge
when form is imposed on matter is not just properties but substances. When
material components are combined into something higher level with a particular
configuration, a substance will come into being.79
So how is Stump/Aquinas compatible with, while not identical to, Descartes’ dualism?
There are, after all, roadblocks along the way. Dean Zimmerman cautions, “Unless there is some
deep reason to suppose that the real meaning of ‘dualist’ in our mouths does not track our
considered application to individual cases, belief in immaterial formal causes should not be
sufficient to make one a dualist.”80 Substance dualists have reason to believe the Stump/Aquinas
model is not dualistic enough. Materialists, on the other hand, can assert the model is flawed and
not worth the effort, or is, perhaps, nuanced substance dualism with exotic categories. Peter van
Inwagen, for example, is incredulous concerning Aquinas’s view, but also incorrect:
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[Aquinas] teaches that we are some sort of union or amalgam or compound, of a
material and an immaterial substance; and such a union could not be classified as
either material or immaterial. But the form the position takes in his work scarcely
seems coherent. Thomas thinks that I am a union of my soul and my body, the
former being an immaterial substance and the latter a material substance. So far,
this is fairly plain sailing.81
But, as we have seen above: 1) Aquinas holds the human composite can be classified, as
material; and 2) the soul is not immaterial substance or stuff. Again, for Aquinas, the soul is not
a substance at all –hoc aliquid, yes, but substance, no: “…body and soul are not two actually
existing substances, but instead one actually existing substance arises from these two.”82 So, it is
not so fairly plain sailing for van Inwagen, after all. He continues, “But Thomas also thinks that
the soul is the form of the body. I do not see, and no one has ever been able to explain to me, how
something that is the form of a substance can also be a substance.”83 But, the soul is not a
substance (see above), and Aquinas never properly referred to it as such.84 As is plain from
Stump/Aquinas, the union van Inwagen speaks of is a body in-formed by the substantial or
configurational form, and is material, without question, though not merely material.
It seems Zimmerman, who is weary of identifying Aquinas’s view as substance dualism,
outright conflicts with van Inwagen. Obviously, at most only one can be correct (though both of
them could be incorrect). Ultimately, Stump/Aquinas does not identify Paul merely with his soul,
and so the model is, if you will, clear and distinct from Descartes’. For Descartes, the soul and
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body are separate substances that relate to each other via efficient causation–the model is purely
a ghost in a machine, or like Plato’s “motor” Aquinas refers to. This is why the Stump/Aquinas
model is not exactly like substance dualism. We can consider Aquinas’s ‘soul’ to be more like a
dynamic, active blueprint –a form, relating to matter primarily via formal causation. The soul, for
Descartes, is only configured, but not a configurer, but for Stump/Aquinas, it is a configured
configurer, a hoc aliquid; not substance, but it subsists.
So, from statements (A) through (DDD) of the Stump/Aquinas model, we can at least
say, so far, that it is different from substance dualism. But there are some large metaphysical
challenges that still need to be addressed. Does the Stump/Aquinas model answer Plantinga’s
important question in the affirmative, “Does Paul exist when his body does not?” Yes, in the
disembodied state, by holding that Constitution is Not Identity (C ≠ ID). Can the ambiguities
many identify concerning this Stump/Aquinas disembodied state and the immaterial (or perhaps
material) mind be resolved? Yes, by holding that Dependence is Not Identity (D ≠ ID). In the
next chapter I will begin by arguing for the merits these two axioms, both in how they allow the
Stump/Aquinas model to be compatible with substance dualism, and in how they allow the
model to incorporate the useful elements of the various materialist views.
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Chapter Three

A Contemporary Image: Metaphysical Challenges

With the previous points of the Stump/Aquinas model as a foundation, there is still a
dilemma. In order to have a cogent concept of Paul’s bodily resurrection, with personal
numerical identity (NID) intact between death and eternal life, serious metaphysical challenges
need to be addressed. The job is made somewhat easier by two axioms to help us on our way:
Constitution is Not Identity (C ≠ ID) and Dependence is Not Identity (D ≠ ID). The notion of a
‘data backup’ of Paul’s subsisting soul, or configurational state, could tie it all together. But,
while promising, the axioms will not prevail against the challenges (particularly specific
contours of the mind/body problem and vagueness paradoxes) without a modification.
The challenges are presented by wily and deft interlocutors. Plantinga wants to know if
Paul still exists when his body does not –if not, his RA still applies. Nancey Murphy thinks brain
localization studies make Paul’s mind (νους) an entirely material thing (as the brain), and thus
make the soul an obsolete concept. But the most serious of all is one shared by Peter van
Inwagen, Lynne Rudder Baker, Dean Zimmerman, Kevin Corcoran, William Hasker, and
Trenton Merricks, and is due to what Robert Pasnau calls the “mind-soul problem”,85 which will
become painfully evident. All are skeptical of the Stump/Aquinas form or µορϕη, that it is
ambiguous at best and spurious at worst. I will term it the ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ objection: how
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does a configurational state, in-forming the material composite, act as the intellective mind with
causal and psychological powers? Or vice-versa: how is intellective mind also the configured
configurer, giving order to the atoms in our bodies? By the end, I argue Stump/Aquinas needs to
be modified. As a result of the focus these challenges bring, Stump/Aquinas’s soul will be split
into two parts: one, the µορϕη, or configured configurer, and the other, the νους, or intellect.
How, then, do we make sense of the split, and what does it mean for the bodily resurrection?

I. (C ≠ ID) For Paul’s disembodied NID, Constitution is not Identity
Plantinga is hesitant to welcome Stump/Aquinas without, first, a question:
I’ll be arguing that it is possible that I exist when my body doesn’t; is that a
possibility, on Thomas’s view? True, on his view my soul can exist when my
body doesn’t, but it also seems, on this view, that I am not identical with my soul.
Rather, I am a material object that has an immaterial soul as a part. So (on his
view) can I exist when my body does not? If the answer is no, then Aquinas’s
view is not felicitously counted as a version of dualism; at least it is not among
the versions of dualism for which I mean to argue. If, on the other hand, the
answer is yes, we can welcome Aquinas (perhaps a bit cautiously) into the dualist
camp.86
According to Stump, Aquinas’s answer to Plantinga’s question, “Can I exist when my body does
not?” is an unequivocal ‘yes’. It is also the case that Paul is a material object not identical with
his immaterial soul per se –and Paul’s rational soul is also merely a formal cause (while
embodied). Stump says, in what works well as a direct reply to Plantinga:
That constitution is not identity in the case of human beings is clear when it
comes to integral parts, on either the macroscopic or microscopic level. A human
being can survive the loss of some of his elemental bits (or molecular
constituents) or even the loss of some of his larger integral parts, such as a hand.
But Aquinas thinks the point about constitution and identity holds also for
metaphysical parts in the special case of a human being, whose substantial form
can exist on its own.87

86

Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 101.

87

Stump, Aquinas, 52, emphasis mine.

29
So, Stump affirms Plantinga’s Replacement Argument (RA) (both macro and microscopic). She
delicately shows the personhood status of Paul’s disembodied soul by the axiom ‘Constitution is
not Identity’ (C ≠ ID). Let C ≠ ID be Baker’s original, eloquent definition: “persons are
constituted by bodies, but are not identical to bodies…the relation between Smith and her body is
not one of identity.”88 The cliché statement: C ≠ ID entails the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts. So material substances, including Paul as a composite, are composed of constituent
elements, but not identical to the collection of those elements –or else, incremental change over
time would entail a brand new material substance at every moment, which is absurd.89 The
defenders of Stump/Aquinas have all separately identified Baker’s Constitution view as friendly
to the cause.90 Baker’s most notable point seems to be ‘constitution’ should be another sense of
‘is’ alongside ‘predication’ and ‘identity’.91 These concerns are at the heart of Plantinga’s RA,
and are the reason his argument is effective.
Aquinas himself fully affirms C ≠ ID. The matter constituting Paul’s body can change
over time without changing Paul’s numerical identity, if his substantial form remains consistent:
Moreover, the things that are combined with one another do not themselves,
having been combined, remain actually, but only virtually; for, were they to
remain actually, it would be not a mixture, but only a collection; that is why a
body constituted by a mixture of elements is none of these elements.92
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Hence the Philosopher says that, since one kind of composite is constituted of
something in this way “as a whole” –i.e., the whole is one– and not in the way in
which a heap of stones is one but as a syllable is one (without qualification), in all
such cases the composite must not be identical with its components, as a syllable
is not its letters; for this syllable ba is not the same as these two letters b and a,
nor is flesh the same as fire and earth.93
In this way, a soul would be sufficient as the identity condition for Paul over time, without being
fully human. Paul’s resurrection body need not be numerically identical at the atomic level with
his pre-resurrection body, since (given RA) not even his pre-resurrection body could meet such
stringent qualifications for numerical identity. Plantinga shows this by considering how often
and casually the atoms making up all of the cells in our bodies are completely replaced.94 To
come full circle: if RA and C ≠ ID are true on the microscopic level, and true concerning hands
and integral parts, then it is also true of metaphysical parts (body and substantial form/soul).
So, Stump argues that due to both the Replacement Argument (RA) and ‘constitution is not
identity’, having a body is absolutely not essential to Paul’s identity continuing over time:95
1) According to the Aquinas’s Aristotelian metaphysics, a thing which gains or loses
an accidental form undergoes change while remaining one and the same thing.
2) According to ‘constitution is not identity’, a particular substance survives even the
loss of some of its metaphysical constituents, provided that the remaining constituents
can exist on their own and are sufficient for the existence of the substance.
3) Aquinas thinks that a human being can exist without being in the normal condition
in this way because what constitutes a human being is not the same as that to which a
human being is identical.
4) Therefore, since a) what makes Socrates this individual substance is the individual
substantial form which configures him, and b) since the substantial form can exist
independently of the body, then c) the existence of the substantial form separate from
the body is sufficient for the existence of the person whose substantial form it is.
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This shows clearly how RA and C ≠ ID go hand-in-hand: in the same way Paul survives
the loss of his integral parts (like a hand), Paul can survive the loss of even the metaphysical part
of his whole body, because the substantial form of his body (the soul) is able to independently
exist as a hoc aliquid. Eberl says, “Soul and body, on the other hand, can be understood as
metaphysical parts that do not exist without composing a human being.”96 RA merely says
material continuity is not required for Paul’s NID. But RA and C ≠ ID show Paul’s subsisting
soul is all that is metaphysically necessary, though not natural, for his NID. Thus, Stump says:
A human person is not identical to his soul; rather, a human person is identical to
a particular in the species rational animal. A particular of that sort is normally,
naturally, constituted of an array of bodily parts and is composed of form and
matter. Because constitution is not identity for Aquinas, however, a particular can
exist with less than the normal, natural compliment of constituents. It can, for
example, exist when it is constituted only by one of its main metaphysical parts,
namely the soul. And so although a person is not identical to his soul, the
existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of a person.97

II. The Data Backup Analogy
The trouble is how to paint a conceptual picture of this disembodied state (the separated
configured configurer) that makes sense. Plantinga floats a helpful kernel of an idea our way, one
that has been passed around somewhat. “Not strictly relevant, but of interest: could I perhaps be
a computer (hardware), a computer made of flesh and blood? There are three possibilities here: I
might be the hardware, I might be the program, and I might be the mereological sum of the
hardware and the program.”98 When coupled with the possibility –in the midst of his
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macroscopic RA– that both the configured configurer and the computational or functional state
of the mind are transferred, we get something interesting, but initially vague.
Fortunately, John Polkinghorne fleshes out these intuitions a bit more, by saying, “In a
very crude image, one might say that the soul is the software running on the hardware of the
body.”99 He admits first the concept of ‘soul’ is still “indispensible for the credible articulation
of Christian hope, but its content requires reexamination in the light of contemporary
understanding of human nature.”100 He recognizes RA for what it is: the criterion for personal
identity cannot be our bodies, for “Materially, we are in a state of flux”;101 Polkinghorne thus
suggests we “understand the soul as being the almost infinitely complex, dynamic, informationbearing pattern in which the matter of our bodies at any one time is organized.”102 To him, from
the theological side of things, it is coherent to say God will perfectly preserve in memory each
individual person’s information-bearing pattern, and then re-embody them all in the eschaton.103
Baker gives credence to Polkinghorne’s view, combining it with two other similar views,
the “memory criterion” and the “soul-as-software view.”104 She points out that all of them need
to overcome the problem of duplication of such information to retain unique personal identity
(which I will address in the next chapter), and of course recommends her Constitution view be
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included for them to be metaphysically successful. Stump/Aquinas upholds C ≠ ID: so far, so
good. This means Plantinga, Polkinghorne and Baker all share an intuition about this possible
information-backup model, and the missing pieces can come together in the Stump/Aquinas
disembodied state. Beyond C ≠ ID, formal causation is affirmed, which seems to be a
requirement, as well, as Polkinghorne notes:
You will recognize that this is an old idea presented in modern dress, for I am
saying that the soul is the form of the body, a thought that would not have seemed
strange either to Aristotle or to Thomas Aquinas, though perhaps I wish to think
more dynamically about it than they would have been inclined to do.105
So, then, I conclude: Paul, properly humanae persona, is the sum of the hardware and the
program while embodied. Because C ≠ ID, the “data backup” happens along the lines of the
Stump/Aquinas disembodied state before the resurrection. Paul’s soul subsists as a hoc aliquid,
but not as a substance. Paul’s soul can be understood to be an ontologically self-extant106
information-bearing pattern, or configured configurer, that will once again do its job and re-inform in the bodily resurrection. Properly understood, it does not make sense to suggest the
‘program’ is Paul, and likewise his substantial form cannot be his material composite (which
would not just be his brain, since mental states and rationality are properties of Paul simpliciter).
But, as attested above, Paul needs a body to be fully Paul, to be the composite single substance
of Paul. But the pattern of Paul can be perfectly backed up, by God, for the purposes of
numerical identity into the bodily resurrection: so Paul does not just have a composite, he has his
composite.107 Here, ‘soul’ refers to the essence of Paul: that which is uniquely, individually him
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and the seat of his personhood. So, along with the configured configurer, all mental
contents/νους (memory, knowledge, character, consciousness, personality) are “backed up” like
data or information. Information is immaterial and abstract by nature, and so satisfies RA.
This works because, under the unmodified Stump/Aquinas model, “the imposition of the
configurational state on new matter preserves the identity of the person.”108 The backed up or
subsisting soul is (and is doing) two things: 1) Retaining a configurational state (or, if you will, a
blueprint) of the material composite via the configured configurer in order to re-build it in the
resurrection; 2) Retaining Paul’s intellectual, or rational aspect, or perhaps what could commonly
be referred to as his psychological identity. If it is the case Paul’s soul is ‘backed up’ in this way,
then the identity condition is acceptable to answer Plantinga in the affirmative: Paul exists when
his body does not.109 In the realm of possibility, Paul’s intellect could be extant as a perfect
neural image or brain-map, to be restored like a data image on a backed up computer hard drive,
or .iso image110 for an optical disc (thus, “data backup” analogy). But here, the backup of Paul
also includes the blueprint for exactly how his material composite should be configured.
Van Inwagen makes a helpful ontological distinction for processing how this ‘data
backup’ looks in terms of the disembodied state.111 When we ask of ‘being’, and then place it
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within the context of ‘human being’, we are coming upon two different shades of ‘exist’. So van
Inwagen gives us two kinds of existence: concrete and abstract. For him, “there is only one kind
of concrete object: that which has traditionally been called ‘substance’ or ‘individual thing’. And
there is only one type of abstract object. I will call this one type ‘relation’.”112 Whereas the
‘concrete’ existence is active (as substance), ‘abstract’ existence is potential (as relation). Van
Inwagen balks at calling human persons relations, and concludes “If we exist at all, we’re
substances.”113 But to borrow van Inwagen’s vocabulary for the sake of clarity, I am disagreeing
and saying this: for Stump/Aquinas, in the disembodied or intermediate state, the substantial
form of the human person (the soul) temporarily goes from metaphysically concrete to abstract,
or from substance to relation. Or from existential to extant. Or from active to potential. Or, to be
weightier, but also clearer for those who have ears to hear: from µορϕη to εἶδος.
Given these loaded terms, there is a live question concerning how Paul’s intellective state
(consciousness included) continues. We can conceive of it as a “deficient” or “unnatural” form
of existence and cognition. In terms of this disembodied state, van Dyke says, “the soul actually
has a different mode of cognition that requires divine assistance.”114 In this state, composed only
of his soul, Paul does not cease being human; the capacities of a rational animal are still extant,
therefore take the thesis that I’m a computer program less seriously than one would take the thesis that I’m a
poached egg, and that’s not very seriously.” “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person,” 203. It seems, for
Stump/Aquinas, this is apples and oranges (or poached and scrambled eggs). He points out elsewhere that it hardly
makes sense to him to consider a fully-grown adult brain as a blank computer disk, because of the biological process
of growth and sense reception. Brains atrophy and fail to develop normally when not included in these processes, for
example, which speaks to van Inwagen’s hunch: a mere transfer of “states” or “information” does not work. He
eruditely says, “Remember how long it took all the information that is stored in your brain to actually get there.”
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but only in potentiality, since such capacities need material organs in-formed by the configured
configurer to be actualized.115 Paul’s soul awaits the hope of being again the in-former for the
material composite to which it is naturally inclined. The only thing distinguishing the
Stump/Aquinas ‘data backup’ from Polkinghorne’s idea is ontological independence. For
Stump/Aquinas, the soul subsists as an individual thing, rather than just being “preserved in the
divine memory.”116 Van Dyke makes sense of this, “Although the human soul is not available to
the natural realm, God still has ‘access’ to the human soul and can restore the human body by
rejoining the body to its principle of action.”117 Stump notes what is at stake:118 According to
Aquinas, Paul’s separated soul must contain his active mind, with intellectual faculties Paul had
in his lifetime, the same will, experiences and passions. So, what is the ontological status of Paul,
disembodied? Stump says Paul’s soul is clearly a hoc aliquid, a something. But to make it more
interesting: Aquinas writes in SCG IV 91-92 that Paul’s separated soul is judged for doing what
Paul did during his life in the body, and afterward resurrected into his body or composite. If the
soul is not the numerically same person, then who is getting judged? The Stump/Aquinas
disembodied soul, then, must have restricted cognitive powers and be ontologically distinct as an
individual thing; cognition and the senses are upheld by divine intervention, in order to retain
continuity of the person being raised.119
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In sum, C ≠ ID means RA, and thus the requirement from dualism, is satisfied. The
disembodied state subsists, and it would look much like the backup of an information-bearing
pattern as described by Polkinghorne, except that for Stump/Aquinas, the subsisting soul is
ontologically independent –but still somehow upheld by divine intervention for cognizing. Paul’s
subsisting soul can count as an identity condition over time for his resurrection self. But, the
mind-soul/’µορϕη schmorphe’ objection still looms. How do we incorporate the mind into the
‘data backup’ model of the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state? The functioning of the brain as
emerging from the material composite could work as long as Paul is embodied. But how do we
conceive of this switching between states? This calls for the sixth and final statement of the
Stump/Aquinas model. Since it comes accompanied by some deep metaphysical challenges, it
demands that the model be modified if it is to succeed.

III. (D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental states, Dependence is Not Identity
Plantinga entertains one argument among a few he recognizes for materialism: brain
localization and dependence of mental states upon material brain states. He says, “It isn’t true at
all that it makes very little sense to say that activities of the immaterial self or soul are dependent
in this way on the proper function of the brain. Still, this argument from localization and neural
dependence is perhaps the strongest of the arguments against dualism.”120 Plantinga sees Nancey
Murphy, among others, arguing how science identifies certain parts of the brain are responsible
for rational processes like language, emotion, musical ability, or complex problem solving.
Indeed there are, he says, countless first-hand experiences of drug use, degenerative neurological
disorders or other diseases, taking prescriptions to alter brain chemistry, and even getting hit in
the head to show that the brain certainly has something to do with mental states.
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In particular, there are a few cases that have become fairly common currency in these
types of discussions. One is Phineas Gage, a Vermont man who in 1848 suffered and survived an
accident where a three foot, seven inch long and 1.25 inch diameter tamping rod went straight
through his frontal lobe (specifically parts of his prefrontal cortexes), and seemingly altered his
temperament and personality –and not just as a reaction to the accident (for who wouldn’t feel a
bit different after an accident like that?), but as a result of the destroyed part of the brain.121
Although the more well-known details surrounding the extent of his character change are
infamously cloudy and documented sometime after the event, it is at least a rare, clear, and also
dramatic example of someone’s physical brain so surely having an effect on their mental states.
Phineas Gage’s historical case seems to point toward brain localization.
More recently Clive Wearing, a British conductor and musicologist, in 1985 contracted
herpes simplex encephalitis, a viral infection that normally produces cold sores –but for him, it
infected and destroyed his left frontal and temporal regions, the parts of the brain partially
responsible for storing conscious memories.122 He developed severe anterograde amnesia (so he
cannot form any new short-term memories) and retrograde amnesia. That, alone, for many
proves mental states’ dependence upon the brain. What is more intriguing is what he can do:
Wearing’s procedural memory is apparently unaffected. He can still read and play music with the
same rehearsed dramatic force and brilliant interpretation as he could before the illness.123 The
hypothesis is that one part of the brain controls the sort of memory utilized in performance and
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rote memorization of music and all of its intricacies, and a different part seems to control
personality and other aspects. Wearing and his damaged brain seem to be living proof of brain
localization, and perhaps Murphy’s nonreductive physicalist model and others like it.
From the materialist point of view, here is the underlying challenge: does localization and
dependence of the brain by behavioral and personality traits and other mental states make the
immaterial soul an unnecessary concept? In stride, Plantinga’s rejoinder to Murphy’s, and
others’, arguments from localization is, for him, characteristically pithy: “Does this show or tend
to show that this mental activity is really an activity of the brain, rather than of something
distinct from the brain? Hardly. There are many activities that stand in that same or similar
relation to the brain.”124 By similar reasoning, observes Plantinga, one could say walking,
speaking, moving your fingers, breathing, and digesting are also functions of the brain, since
they all depend upon proper function of the brain (although the parallel organ for mental states is
not so apparent, as Aquinas himself says in QDA 1 and 2). This is where he introduces D ≠ ID:
The point, obviously, is that dependence is one thing, identity quite another.
Appropriate brain activity is a necessary condition for mental activity; it simply
doesn’t follow that the latter just is the former…We know all sorts of cases of
activities A that depend upon activities B but are not identical with them. Why
should we think differently in this case?125
Stated in this way, D ≠ ID is basically C ≠ ID but related to mental kinds –i.e. just as Paul’s
material composite is constituted by, but not identical to, his body, so too Paul’s mental states are
dependent upon (perhaps even materially and efficiently caused), but not identical to, his brain
states. Consider D ≠ ID to be the metaphysical cousin of C ≠ ID, just pointed at νους.
Murphy has taken the mantle of the materialist/physicalist position, going so far as to say,
after mention of Phineas Gage’s case, "In short, what [Aquinas] described as the 'appetite for the
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good' appears to depend directly on localizable brain functions."126 She argues that the mind is
dependent upon the brain, which is enough to make Aquinas’s concept of the soul obsolete. Her
view of the contest between dualism and physicalism is a novel one: each is not merely “a
philosophical thesis but as the ‘hard core’ of a scientific research program…based on the
philosophy of science of Emre Lakatos, who argued that research programs in science are unified
by metaphysical theses about the essential nature of the subject matter under investigation.”127
Riding the momentum of invoking Lakatos, she believes “a philosophical case for mind-body
dualism (or body-soul dualism) is in fact hopeless.”128 Murphy wants to show how we ought to
operate upon a contemporary scientific paradigm, or research program, whereby mental states
are, in contrast to D ≠ ID, dependent upon and identical to their requisite brain states.129
Beyond that, her presuppositions leading into her treatment of Aquinas deserve attention.
Murphy categorically breaks down mental characteristics from neuroscience that Aquinas
historically relegated to the soul, to make a case for Aquinas’s obsolescence.130 But given the
Stump/Aquinas Aristotelian causality discussed above, what Murphy intends as a critique of
Aquinas’s medieval view can actually be inverted into support for Stump’s interpretation –even
the exact words could be read in a different tone and this inversion could be expressed. Causality
shows how baseless Murphy’s strategy is given the distinction between the in-forming soul being
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the formal cause of the material body’s processes, while the organs it in-forms (including the
brain) are the efficient cause of those processes. With this formal-efficient causal relationship in
mind, it is possible to carefully balance D ≠ ID from Stump/Aquinas and still acquiesce with the
findings of modern neuroscience. But Murphy’s point of view holds her back, and is precisely of
the sort Stump anticipates and attempts to dissolve by comparing physicalism/materialism
alongside Aquinas, when she says:
At this point it might occur to someone to suppose that it can hardly be surprising
that Aquinas’s account of the soul is not readily assimilable to either dualism or
physicalism; the difficulty in categorizing Aquinas, such a person might think,
stems from trying to insert a peculiarly medieval theory into the contemporary
discussion, where it simply will not fit. But I think this is a mistaken attitude.131
Stump actually offers up the possibility that Aquinas could be construed as a materialist with a
metaphysical reason for rejecting reductionism. Though he would not say the mind is identical to
the brain, Stump says “for Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural
condition) in matter.”132 So Aquinas’s view of the soul can be successfully held alongside
materialism’s understanding of the brain as the locus on mental activity, due to D ≠ ID. It seems,
then, Murphy’s view that Aquinas’s understanding of the soul is incompatible with her own
nonreductive physicalism is throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If we introduce Stump’s
interpretation of Aquinas, above, many of Murphy’s observations can be assimilated. Besides
Stump and her supporters, Baker,133 Hasker,134 Corcoran,135 Zimmerman,136 and Plantinga137 all
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admit, after close readings, that Aquinas’s human persons work with materialist anthropology.
Why, then, would Murphy dismiss Aquinas? Are these philosophers wrong and Murphy right?
Not likely. Derek Jefferys argues against Murphy concerning her treatment of Aquinas,
and lack of adequate conception of metaphysical causation to support her proposed downward
causation model, among other issues.138 Murphy responds, since Aquinas is ancient/medieval his
terminology and his Aristotelian metaphysical research program ought to be replaced by
something more relevant to current scientific anthropology. She uses Lakatos as support, citing
“incommensurability” between the two systems.139 Jefferys thinks this is an inadequate response:
Throughout American and European philosophy departments, philosophers are
rediscovering Thomas and Aristotle. Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, John
Haldane, Alasdair MacIntyre, Leon Kass, and many others are reviving
Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts, applying them to ethics, the philosophy of
mind, and the philosophy of science. They have no difficulty understanding the
philosophical grammar of Thomas and Aristotle, and combine it with
contemporary philosophy and science in fascinating ways.140
To follow Jefferys’s lead, before Murphy can play her Kuhn/Lakatos card141 and contextualize
the debate away, she ought to read more of the available literature on Aquinas (perhaps even
Stump’s work, whom Murphy never cites). The end result of allowing equal footing to
Aristotelian metaphysics has been shown to be quite helpful to some contemporary studies. For
Stump, asserting Aquinas’s possible compatibility with modern neuroscience is yet another
example of this, one that should not be so quickly ignored.
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V. Stump/Aquinas, D ≠ ID, νους, and the Data Backup
From Murphy, we must heed the fact that brain imaging and modern neuroscience shows
that the physical brain at least plays a role in attributes that were previously relegated only to the
immaterial soul. So the task, now, is to show first how Aquinas supports D ≠ ID, and second
show how the Stump/Aquinas model accommodates what we can say regarding the way mental
states depend on the brain. Of course, Aquinas is not a materialist in the overarching
metaphysical sense of the term:142 recall that God is a person by Boethius’s definition and is a
µορϕη that does not in-form ὕλη because He is pure act. Humans are corporeal and spiritual in
substance, whose substantial forms (souls) can subsist apart from the ὕλη they would properly
in-form in their single-substance composite. Aquinas, then, matches Plantinga’s sentiment, when
he says in SCG Book II: “intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and although they [that is,
intellectual natures] exist in matter, their being does not depend on matter.”143
So, right away, we have a contemporary axiom (D ≠ ID) with a medieval analogue. What
we also have is an admission that intellectual natures “exist in matter.” This is exactly why
Stump says, for Aquinas, “mental states will be implemented in matter,” and his account of the
soul, then, is “compatible with supposing that mental states are implemented in neural stuff.”144
This is a significant assertion we can build upon, and is at the heart of the idea of substanceemergence that Hasker found so very promising with Stump’s model:
I close this chapter by referring to yet another saying of Stump’s that I find
puzzling, yet also full of promise…What intrigues me in this is the suggestion that
Aquinas might have thought that ‘the mind emerges from the functioning of the
brain.’ [Stump, “Non-Cartesian,” 520] What does Stump mean by this? Clearly,
the historical Aquinas would not have thought this, given his doctrine of the
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special creation of individual souls –a doctrine which Stump refers to several
times. Does she mean that he should have thought this way, and perhaps would
have done so had more scientific knowledge been available to him? Or is the
notion of emergence here to be understood in some way that is compatible with
Aquinas’s creationism?145
It is correct to say that Stump affirms Hasker’s premonition. If Aquinas had more scientific
knowledge, his understanding of the relationship of mind to the brain, and therefore his
understanding of the soul, may have been more nuanced. (Furthermore, I intend to show in the
next chapter that the added contemporary knowledge of DNA has a similar helpful effect toward
interpreting and applying Aquinas’s view of the soul.) Note also that this important assertion,
“the mind emerges from the functioning of the brain,” is why Swinburne is correct to say
Aquinas does not recognize the category of “soul stuff.”146 It is because for Aquinas, and thus the
Stump/Aquinas model, while the material composite is functioning (and the soul is not
disembodied), it is “brain stuff” or “neural stuff” doing the work –an insight from which
Murphy’s reading of Aquinas could benefit. And, again contrary to Swinburne, Stump assuages
what Plantinga had also been skeptical of, “The immateriality of the soul is [for Aquinas] a direct
consequence of his view of soul as a form.”147 In other words: the Aristotelian framework informing the material composite makes the immaterial soul a reality. But how? Again, think of
the human soul, the amphibious configured configurer, as the formal, but not efficient, cause of
mental states and other casual connections, which are then only immaterial when unnaturally
‘backed up’ in the disembodied state. In other words, “the various parts of the body are
configured by [the soul] in differing ways.”148 It makes the whole thing possible by in-forming
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the materials from which mental states emerge –but the soul is not a wispy spirit-form that does
the thinking while the brain is the material foundation for the soul’s activity. Thus, Stump says:
…Aquinas thinks that there is something misleading about attributing cognitive
functions just to the soul itself. Rather, even such higher cognitive functions as
understanding are to be attributed to the whole material composite that is the
human being.149
This is reinforced by Aquinas himself in SCG II.50: “if an intelligent substance is composed of
matter and form, understanding will be of the composite itself.”150 While the point of SCG II.50
is actually to show intelligent substances are not composed of matter, this is to uphold the
consistency of Boethius’s definition of ‘person’, which must of course also include God and
angels. However, this specific part makes clear that, for human persons, their intellect, if from
the composite, will be of the composite. This is how Stump can get away with saying things like,
“If we can understand the intellective part of the human soul as roughly equivalent to the mind,
then for Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural condition) in matter.”151
She clearly distinguishes parts of the soul, i.e. “intellective part,” because Stump recognizes the
‘configured configurer’ which in-forms the material composite must be somehow different from
the intellective mind or νους.
We should be keeping in sight what Murphy and others bring up in regards to localization
and the dependence of mental states upon the brain. The Stump/Aquinas model, in terms of the
intellect, holds the human soul is the formal, not efficient, cause of mental states and other casual
connections, and the soul is immaterial only unnaturally in the disembodied state. The capacities
and activities of the soul, including intellect, are in this way realized through the material organs
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of the in-formed composite. The five senses, for example, are properties of the material
composite, and require the proper organs (eyes, ears, nose, and so forth) to operate. The brain
and nervous system, then, are the efficient cause for mental states and likewise require a body.152
The soul, as ‘configured configurer’, is the formal cause for all of this. Thus, “On Aquinas’s
account, there is no efficient causal interaction between the soul and the matter it informs, and all
cognitive functions can be implemented in the body.”153 These capacities, mental states included,
are properly attributed to the composite of Paul, not to his parts –including the brain.
However, as stated earlier, given what Aquinas says about the separated soul in the
disembodied state, he would affirm the apparent dependence of mental states upon the brain, but
not think that the mind is identical to the brain if he had known enough neuroscience today.
Ergo, D ≠ ID. If mental states are dependent upon, but not identical to brain states in this way,
then the brain’s configurational state, or neural map, or however we could conceive of it, could
backed up immaterially as information. Loosely, the disembodied, ‘backed up’ soul can still
think because of God’s agency in upholding that power.154 To reiterate, this state is of a deficient
sort. Aquinas says, “although the soul can exist and intellectively cognize when it is separated
from the body, nonetheless it does not have the perfection of its nature when it is separated from
the body.”155 So according to Aquinas, while embodied, Paul’s mind is able to be measured by
brain scans, neurological science, and the like, and is very much like an emergent property akin
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to Hasker’s model: “material components are combined into something higher-level with a
particular configuration, a substance will come into being,”156 But in the case of the
Stump/Aquinas model, the mind does not go away in the disembodied state, either; rather, in the
bodily resurrection, it is restored to its proper, composite, state.

VI. “Μορϕη Schmorphe” and Mind-Soul Make a Modification Mandatory
Given C ≠ ID, Stump/Aquinas can affirm RA, and thus the requirement from dualism.
Given D ≠ ID, Stump/Aquinas avoids the objections raised by dualists against materialists. So,
we can get the blessing from substance dualists, as well as the useful parts of the different
materialisms, including the deliverances of the Constitution view and an understanding of mind
or νους somewhat like an emergent property of the material brain (while embodied). Now that
these details are worked out, we see that if brain localization is a strong point for materialists,
then the Stump/Aquinas model can accommodate it in an embodied material composite. When
we combine all of these elements together: C ≠ ID, D ≠ ID, the immaterial in-form-ation of the
configured configurer, and the analogy of a data backup of that configuring form, and we add to
it the information of Paul’s mind or νους, we get a model for individuation of human persons,
and a model for the continuity of personal NID, preserved for the bodily resurrection. Or do we?
Our wily and deft interlocutors, after all, have been waiting in the wings. Baker says, “It
is difficult to see how Aquinas can combine the Aristotelian view that matter individuates with
his view that the soul is a substantial form that can ‘subsist’ –and experience God– apart from a
body.”157 Zimmerman likewise says, “What is harder to see is how something capable of playing
the role of a ‘substantial form’ could come to be able to think after death, while not ‘informing’
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any matter.”158 Plantinga puts it this way, “A form, however, at least as far as I can see, is or is
like a property; and a property, presumably, can’t think. If the soul is a form, therefore, how can
it be capable of thinking?”159 Van Inwagen makes his case more bluntly than the rest, “wouldn’t
the union of my body and the form of my body, whatever the form of my body may be, be
simply my body? And isn’t my body, without qualification, a material substance?”160 Corcoran
does Stump’s view more justice, but sees the problem of immaterial substances has just been
pushed back from human-identical souls to configuring forms-as-souls. Incomplete substance
though they may be, Stump/Aquinas souls still seem to be of some sort of immaterial kind, and
the resulting disembodied state seems to be incoherent, to Corcoran.161 Hasker, who like
Corcoran is charitable to the Stump/Aquinas model, similarly finds Stump’s ‘form’ to be
ambiguous when dealing with a subsisting soul as human intellectual mind, insofar as it is still
too similar to substance dualism, in his view.162
All of these objections reduce into one proviso about the Stump/Aquinas model, ‘µορϕη
schmorphe’. All of the above ambiguities surrounding µορϕη center on NID over time for the
bodily resurrection, whether they are directed toward the question of persistence apart from the
body (as with Baker, van Inwagen, Corcoran, and Hasker), or more particularly toward
psychological continuity as NID, and how therefore an immaterial substance can think (as with
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Zimmerman and Plantinga, and also Baker). So, there are two forks to ‘µορϕη schmorphe’: 1) if
soul/µορϕη is ambiguous, it cannot properly handle Paul’s disembodied state and also be the
criterion for his NID over time; 2) if mind/νους is ambiguous, Stump/Aquinas will not be able to
really discern whether it is immaterial or a property of Paul’s composite. But how does νους
contain the blueprint to in-form Paul’s material composite? How is a µορϕη blueprint, formal
causation and all, still the efficient cause for his mental states? If νους belongs to an entity
distinct from Paul’s body, and the soul as configured configurer is the µορϕη of Paul, then how is
νους part of his subsisting soul? It seems obvious: for the Stump/Aquinas model, the soul must
be, somehow, two parts comprising one soul, or µορϕη plus νους.
Pasnau, in fact, recognizes this dilemma in the midst of identifying the mind-soul
problem for Aquinas: "there are considerable pressures on an Aristotelian to pull the two [soul
and intellect] apart. Aquinas is not entitled to assume that facts about the intellect can be
parlayed into facts about the soul.”163 In ST Ia.q77, Thomas attempts and only lightly gives us
that split picture of the two jobs of the disembodied soul, as Pasnau also illumines:
[Aquinas] wants to say that the rational soul is the form of the body, in one
respect, and not the form of the body, in another respect. As regards its essence,
the soul precisely is the form or actuality of the body. But intellect, the soul's
intellective capacity, is neither the form nor the actuality of any body.164
Pasnau says that if Aquinas wants to uphold the soul both as configurational form subsisting
after death and as immaterial intellect/νους, he must do so while simultaneously showing the
νους is part of that configuring form, or else ST Ia.q77.a5 is in danger of becoming a circular
argument: the intellect exists in the soul as its subject, and we know this because the soul is the

163

Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 162.

164

Ibid, 159.

50
configuring form of the composite, which is a substance, which is a subject.165 This is exactly
what Aquinas does back in ST Ia.76.1c, "this principle through which we first intellectively
cognize, whether it be called intellect or the intellective soul, is the form of the body." Pasnau
indicates Aquinas’s strategy, here, “is to establish the unity of soul and body by focusing on the
hardest case, that of intellect. If he can show that intellect and body are unified, then the same
can be shown, straightaway, for the rest of the soul."166 Here is what this means for us: feasibly,
if the νους is somehow a property of the in-formed composite, and the µορϕη has a role in
formally causing and configuring what is necessary for Paul’s νους to develop, and if D ≠ ID is
enough to show Paul’s νους is not identical to his material composite (or brain states), and if C ≠
ID successfully demonstrates Paul can still be Paul while undergoing incremental material
change over time, then there could be an answer to ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ –albeit an extremely
complex one. But who said a solution to the individuation of persons would be easy?
To complicate things even further, concerning Aquinas’s position, Trenton Merricks
thinks because a composite (Thomistic) dualist denies Paul is identical with his soul (though
holding the subsisting soul still has mental properties), the Thomistic dualist must say there are
two objects with Paul’s mental properties, Paul and his soul.167 At least, there, we can argue
(given C ≠ ID and D ≠ ID) we are still talking about the same numerical person –Paul is just
‘backed up’ in the disembodied state as a subsistent soul. Same soul, same Paul, just waiting to
be resurrected. But, even if µορϕη is worked out in the proposed way above (i.e. by splitting the
rational soul into µορϕη and νους), then concerning the resurrection and individuation of persons
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in general, Merricks might be able to show Stump/Aquinas’s subsisting soul still only seems to
be an enduring psychological continuity criterion for NID over time. The ambiguity about µορϕη
just makes the NID problem low-hanging fruit: if material continuity over time is insufficient for
NID, and psychological continuity (aka the “memory criterion”) is likewise insufficient for the
NID of persons, then personal NID over time must be a “brute fact” and we ought to be realists
about it, instead.168 So, given the different versions of ‘µορϕη schmorphe’ (including Merricks’s
version), we have sincere troubles making C ≠ ID and D ≠ ID work for the Stump/Aquinas
model to satisfy the criteria for NID over time for the resurrection. It needs a modification: that
can make sense of the necessary split between µορϕη and νους; that upholds µορϕη as
configured configurer; that nuances the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state/subsisting soul; that
shows νους can be implemented in the material composite but not identical to the brain states
therein. We need that modification, or else Merricks is right: personal NID is just a brute fact.
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Chapter Four

The Modification: DNA, and the Resulting Objections

Let us re-cap the argument so far. In chapter two, I argued for the first four points of the
Stump/Aquinas model: (A) Aristotelian metaphysical causality: soul is hylomorphic form (B)
Boethius’s definition of person: human persons are metaphysical amphibians; (CC) Configured
configurer of the material composite is Stump’s ‘soul’; (DDD) Descartes’ dualism is denied.
Human persons are one composite material substance and not two substances. Aristotle’s four
causes are at the forefront to think within Aquinas’s metaphysical context about the soul, which
is “the first principle of life in things that live among us.”169 The most important is formal
causation (µορϕη), because the Stump/Aquinas human soul, as substantial form, in-forms prime
matter into the material composite of the human body and the soul-as-form. Boethius’s definition
of a person (“an individual substance with a rational nature”) means the nature of human beings
as immaterial minds expressed in a material composite is metaphysically amphibious. The
human soul, as configured configurer, is unique as the only µορϕη that survives the matter it informs –it subsists. But the disembodied soul only meets the criteria for being a hoc aliquid
(particular thing) and not the criteria for ‘substance’ for Aquinas.170 So the subsisting, separated
soul is not a substance as so cautiously crafted by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Stump, and this
distinguishes the model from substance dualism.
169
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In chapter three I argued the Stump/Aquinas model answers Plantinga in the affirmative,
“Does Paul exist when his body does not?” with ‘(C ≠ ID) For Paul’s disembodied NID,
Constitution is not Identity’. To give the Stump/Aquinas disembodied state more clarity, I
introduced the ‘data backup’ analogy via Polkinghorne’s information-bearing pattern. I then
argued that the ambiguities many identify concerning Stump/Aquinas and the intellect can be
resolved with ‘(D ≠ ID) Between the brain and mental states, Dependence is Not Identity’. Since
brain localization is a potential weak spot for dualism but a strong spot for materialism, I argued
that Stump/Aquinas can include the findings of modern neuroscience (and thus the materialists’
big reason for holding their view) with D ≠ ID, and the mind ‘backed up’ along with the
configured configurer. But, even with these two axioms, some metaphysical challenges highlight
the Stump/Aquinas model’s confusing Achilles’ heel: the ambiguity of ‘form’ (the ‘µορϕη
schmorphe’ objection) and its bearing on the problem of NID for the resurrection. It seems the
Stump/Aquinas soul must be understood somehow as a µορϕη part and a νους part in one
unqualified soul. But if it still reduces to a psychological continuity model (and if NID models
based only on psychological continuity do not work), then NID is a brute fact, and
Stump/Aquinas has nothing worthwhile to offer.
However, I will argue that it most certainly does have something to offer. My ambitious
purpose in this chapter is to show DNA can be understood as the contemporary analogue for the
Stump/Aquinas ‘configured configurer’ of the composite human person. Along with this claim
comes the hermeneutical charge to read Aquinas differently on soul, and many objections that
need to be addressed. I hope to show that just as Democritus can be seen as a herald of modern
atomic theory, so too, we can say Aquinas saw DNA’s day and was glad.
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I. De Anima, DNA
Aquinas, himself, identified the inadequacy of physical atoms as the criteria for personal
NID. But instead of saying NID is a brute fact, he offered up a possible solution in SCG
IV.81.12-13, Aquinas’s primary text on NID and the resurrection. Swinburne elucidates
Aquinas’s move, and unwittingly sets up the possibility for DNA as the solution. Swinburne
starts by identifying the antiquity of the NID problem, with the cannibal thought-experiment and
the resulting question, if matter is what counts for the identity condition, and the matter of many
persons is now part of the cannibal who ate them, how do we sort out the conflicting matterclaims for the multiple resurrected bodies that need it? Swinburne says Aquinas starts his answer
by saying, “if something was materially present in many men, it will rise in him to whose
perfection it belonged,” or whatever part of the body essential for Paul to be Paul will belong to
Paul in the bodily resurrection.171 But what part is that, and how do we safeguard from it not
coming from someone else’s essential matter? Swinburne thinks he has Aquinas in a corner:
Aquinas goes on to produce an argument that the ‘radical seed’ (i.e. the sperm,
which according to Aristotle formed the original matter of the embryo) forms the
minimum essential bodily core around which a man could be rebuilt. But we
know now, as Aquinas did not, that the sperm does not remain as a unit within the
organism…The atoms of the original cell are not therefore the most plausible
candidate for being the part of the body physically necessary for human personal
identity. Aquinas’s problem remains without modern solution.172
But let us consider what Aquinas is really saying in this section. Back in IV.81.12, just a
subchapter prior, he says, “it is not with respect to matter that he has the same parts, but with
respect to his species.”173 Aquinas thinks through the problem of a person materially changing
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through time as they develop and grow, and by basically reaffirming C ≠ ID,174 comes to the
conclusion that whatever is the bearer of identity over time, it must not be material. He says:
In this way, then, this is not a requirement of man’s arising with numerical
identity: that he should assume again whatever has been in him during the whole
time of his life; but he need assume from that matter only what suffices to
complete the quantity due, and that especially must be resumed which was more
perfectly consistent with the form and species of humanity.175
So, according to Swinburne, Aquinas thinks the identity condition for the resurrection will be an
essential part, as in ὕλη stuff. But is that what Aquinas is saying? If we think of the essential part
as a metaphysical part, consistent with his understanding of a subsistent-but-not-substance soul,
then we may be getting closer to what he intended. As Eberl affirms, “Aquinas asserts that the
identity of a resurrected human being is ‘made when the same soul is conjoined to the
numerically same body’.”176 Then, the observation from Aquinas concerning “radical seed”
makes more sense: “Accordingly, if something was in one man as the radical seed from which he
was generated, and in another as the superfluity of nourishment, it will rise in him who was
generated therefrom as from seed.”177
While Swinburne points out the obvious as far as what we now know about sperm, what
he is missing is that Aquinas recognizes something important: the criterion for NID over time
will have something to do with whatever is uniquely tied to Paul as his formal cause of
generation, in both the beginning of his earthly life and apparently his resurrected one as well.
The essential part must be a formal cause. Aquinas’s science may be erroneous, but he concluded
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much from little available scientific observation. Case in point, Swinburne is wrong. There is a
modern solution. Concerning Aquinas’s “radical seed,” we can understand it as the information
contained in each individual’s DNA. This is related to what Pasnau calls “the brink of the very
deepest level of Aquinas’s metaphysics.”178 He calls upon Aquinas’s remarks in Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate (QDV) 2.7c, “once the proper essence of a singular is cognized, all of its
singular accidents are cognized.” Pasnau makes one important observation, here: “But from the
deepest metaphysical perspective, all of my various properties, necessary and accidental, flow
from my own distinctive essence. Hence God, who understands that essence, understands
everything about me, past and future.”179 If it is the case that Paul’s unique genome in his DNA
contains the information of the essence of his material composite, then all of Paul’s various
properties, necessary and accidental, flow from the distinctive essence contained in the unique
sequence of his genome. This information in DNA would be the proper essence of the singular of
Paul, would contain all of his singular essential and accidental properties, and would contain how
Paul’s material composite is in-formed, past and future.
It is vital to qualify exactly to what I refer when I say ‘DNA’: I am referring to the
genome, the immaterial information of one’s genetic code. Because of the matching relationship
between the four nucleotide bases between Adenine and Thymine (A and T) and Guanine and
Cytosine (G and C), all of the information of a DNA strand is contained on each side of the
double helix. This is not only vital for cell division and replication in every living thing, but it is
also crucial for our understanding of how DNA can be the criteria for personal NID over time for
the bodily resurrection. Since the completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP), we have had
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the ability to map out the entirety of human DNA,180 and from that the ability to inexpensively
map any individual person’s genome.181 For the purposes of constituting an entire genome, all
that is required are the string of base pairs made up of A, T, G, or C, which is all the data of the
HGP amounts to. And, because of the way the base pairs are matched, only one half of the pairs
are needed in order to have the full genome: a string of letters to signify one side of the doublehelix. The full content of a person’s unique polymer of nucleotide base pairs (and therefore the
blueprint for their particular material composite) is able to be "backed-up" as information, which
is by nature immaterial and abstract.
I am not saying “backing up” the data of Paul’s DNA is merely possible; we have done it.
The HGP is one of the most significant scientific breakthroughs in the last 50 years, and its
results show that the data of the configurational state of a human composite can be processed,
synthesized, and possibly even reconstructed. It is possible with our own technology, to an
extent: we could synthesize the nucleotides, build a genome from the information, make cells
implanted with the new genome, and then engineer them similar to the process of cloning to
make embryos. Given painstaking time, we could, right now, take the information of a genome
and reconstruct it back into the biological substance of DNA. That is what Aquinas’s configured
configurer is –along with, of course, the miracle of DNA-as-form actualizing the human
composite one cell division at a time, from embryo to resurrection. What occurs naturally over a
lifetime happens instantly in the bodily resurrection. DNA is the configurational form, or
blueprint, of Paul’s material body from his first cell all the way to his resurrected body. It is the
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only aspect of Paul that holds unique continuity and remains static over his entire existence.
DNA, as configured configurer, can survive death into the resurrection as data (exactly as the
HGP has done) in a purely in-form-ation bearing state. In this way, DNA perfectly reflects the
heart of what it means for Paul to be metaphysically amphibious, given Boethius’s definition of a
person and Aquinas’s definition of humanae personae. DNA is both immaterial in-form-ation
and a material, biological substance –the immaterial is expressed in the material.
Aquinas’s language describing the soul is more than friendly to my hypothesis of the
immaterial information of DNA as part of the form (the soul) in all living things, particularly
human beings: “Therefore, the soul’s esse, which is of the composite, remains in itself at the
dissolution of the body; and, when the body is restored in resurrection, it is returned in the same
esse that remained in the soul.”182 The form being within the matter, and able to subsist apart
from it, is perfectly explained when viewed through the illuminating lens of DNA. Stump gives
us another way to look at it: “In virtue of this one form, a human being exists as an actual being,
as a material object, as a living thing, as an animal, and as a human being with cognitive
capacities.”183 DNA brings the Stump/Aquinas model to life, and shows how the model can
work, given what we know about human nature from contemporary science and the proposed
‘data backup’ analogy. Understood in the sense of the immaterial data of Paul’s unique genome,
DNA should be considered as configurational in-form-ation of the material composite, as
Aristotle and Aquinas’s ‘nutritive soul’, and ‘backed up’ as the data of Stump's 'configured
configurer' or the subsistent, disembodied human soul.
In terms of Aquinas’s Aristotelian metaphysical background, DNA gives a clearer picture
of hylomorphism. For anyone having trouble understanding how a µορϕη or εἶδος (form) could
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be within a thing, DNA should clear that up, if understood as Aristotle’s nutritive soul. As
Marjorie Grene points out, this can fill the need for a formal cause within contemporary thought,
to open doors to a more cohesive metaphysics: “It is, then, precisely the Aristotelian concept of
form, or some modern analogue thereof, which is lacking in the modern concept of adaptation, or
better, of the organism as a pure aggregate of adaptive mechanisms;’ and later, “Eidos in this
context functions in a number of striking respects in the same way as the concept of organization
(or information) in modern biology.”184 Aristotle identifies form as the actualization of the
matter, and DNA contains more than just genes for certain traits: it has all of the most specific
plans for cell division and differentiation in order to configure the entire body. In other words, it
is a cell-by-cell blueprint to in-form the material composite it is encoded to actualize. I am
saying that information is what constitutes Aristotle’s ‘nutritive soul’,185 and therefore Aquinas's
configured configurer for all living material things, including most especially human persons of
the genus "rational animal." DNA is the formal cause of the material composite.
When materialized and actualized within the composite, DNA can meet the criteria for all
four of Aristotle’s causes. Other than formal causation as the configured configurer, it is the
material cause of Paul’s composite while it is being formed, as each cell physically contains the
biological substance of the DNA molecule. The resulting composite of Paul is itself the efficient
cause for the nutritive, sensate, and (for humans) rational capacities, and DNA is the efficient
cause of the very process of cell division that actualizes each and every cell of the composite.
184
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Eberl says, “As configured, a human soul is a subsistent being. Furthermore, it has certain
specific and individual qualities. By specific qualities, I intend those qualities that are definitive
of the nature of any human being, for example, having human DNA, sensory organs, organs such
as a heart and lungs, and a cerebral cortex.”186 Though one can just barely miss the significance
of DNA,187 for a modified Stump/Aquinas model, it is the formal cause of it all.
In DNA, Paul’s final causation is also satisfied, by carrying out the teleological process
toward his final blueprint –which is fully realized in his bodily resurrection. DNA is not just the
configurational form, but the teleological form of Paul’s physical body, and his bodily
resurrection is his τελος. Grene sees this sort of τελος as a Judeo-Christian imposition upon
Aristotle,188 one to which we can fully admit Aquinas is guilty as charged. However, she admits:
A goal, even if it is an Aristotelian telos, not a conscious purpose, must be the
endpoint of some entity’s becoming. Whose achievement is evolution? Whose
goal, on an evolutionary scale, is thought?....The concept of telos is intelligible
and useful, I submit, only with reference to something already in existence.189
Since DNA in our conception is primarily form, it marries µορϕη and τελος, in the exact way
Aristotle himself suggested.190 How? If human τελος is the bodily resurrected person, then Paul
in his glorified state is perfected to serve the purpose for which God designed him. If DNA
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contains the in-form-ation necessary for that teleological vision to be carried out, and in the
disembodied state, it is ‘backed up’ as εἶδος, then µορϕη/εἶδος and τελος are almost the same
thing, and we can therefore make better sense of Aristotle’s inference (footnote 190, above).
There still looms the crucial question of how to resolve ‘µορϕη schmorphe’, since DNA
is obviously the µορϕη aspect of the soul, but not the νους. How can the µορϕη and νους be
properly split and yet still be of the same unitative form of Paul? Furthermore, there is a problem
of duplication as it relates to the information-bearing pattern or “data backup” analogy.191 Even
if Paul’s DNA can be copied (and make the type/token distinction irrelevant), you would, at best,
have a clone of Paul, mental states intact, without preserving NID. Right? 192 Fortunately, there
are many examples of perfect human genetic clones existing in our world, approximately ten
million, in fact. They are called identical (or monozygotic) twins. Unfortunately, they pose a
potential problem for DNA as the sole vehicle for NID over time: how can we distinguish
essential and accidental properties of NID without it being merely by convention? As a result, we
still need a criterion of NID, alongside DNA, that can handle both static and dynamic (essential
and accidental) properties for the bodily resurrection.

II. Duplication: Monozygotic Twins and Seele-νους
Paul's NID cannot be merely his DNA or configured configurer. Here is why: imagine
Paul has a monozygotic (MZ) twin. Let us call Paul’s twin brother ‘Raul’. Paul and Raul, as MZ
twins, have 100% identical DNA –they are awesome wonders of God’s creation. Identical twins
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pose a serious problem to DNA being the only immaterial information to count for the soul.
When Paul and Raul are bodily resurrected, there is a possibility they will be exactly physically
identical. If they do indeed have the exact same DNA, and no constraining nature/nurture
obstacles from this world when we will all be changed in an instant, then it is possible they
would look exactly the same. A materialist would argue that what individuates Paul and Raul is
their unique material configuration, including possibly the configuration of the atoms forming
their brains to give them their respective mental contents. But, given Plantinga's observation that
material neural connections are not alone sufficient for beliefs or thoughts, and you need to
assign order to any information for it to make sense (similar to the way our brain assign order to
written words, which are nothing apart from that process),193 the materialist is left only to appeal
to immaterial mind to individuate Paul from Raul.
Here is how that works. What could be said of mental contents can be said about the ‘data
backup’, and it might help to sort out Paul and Raul. Computer data, like DNA or mental
contents, is information all by itself: it is a series of zeroes and ones. But that is indecipherable
from, and so also not identical to, what it actually is written to do, ergo D ≠ ID. Data only meets
the conditions of its τελος when it is read properly, through computer hardware. But even the
hardware needs to decipher via a programming language, among other things, to assign order to
the data. Apart from this potentially being an interesting analogical teleological argument for
God’s existence, it means there is something immaterial going on to order the data make it what
it is. The hardware alone is not sufficient to do that. So, for the twins, whatever individuates
between physically indistinguishable Paul and Raul must be more than their DNA. And, given C
≠ ID and D ≠ ID, it must also be more than their physical bodies or brains. We are only left with
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immaterial mental contents, which I will call, for the sake of this thesis only, Seele-νους.194 It is
the only thing completely individuating Paul from his twin brother Raul. Paul's teleological inform-ation, then, as DNA and Seele-νους is sufficient for and not incompatible with the problem
of psychological continuity as NID over time. If MZ twins have identical DNA, and need Seeleνους for individuation, then the same would apply for all human persons. This is consistent with
the Stump/Aquinas model: “Aquinas rejects the view that the soul is only a configurational state
on the grounds that if the soul were only something such as a harmony, it could not exist on its
own, and so ‘it would be only a form similar to other material forms.’”195
DNA and Seele-νους are a package deal for NID and for the resurrection. DNA is the
formal cause of the “hardware” necessary for Seele-νους to function in and through the body, as
teleologically designed. Even for Aquinas himself, DNA alone is insufficient. Stump makes it
clear that, “At death, the soul is replaced with a different, non-animating substantial form. The
matter of the body is then configured in a substantially different way and so has a form different
from the one it had before death.”196 If Paul’s soul was merely his DNA, then it leads to
absurdities. Obviously, even the biological structure of DNA survives death, certainly
immediately after death. Since there is no observable change in the DNA upon death, the change
in the substantial form of the human person must come via the intellective aspect: the Seele-νους.
Again, I do not mean to suggest there are two souls, DNA and Seele-νους, or even that the two
parts of the unified soul are so clearly distinct. In the same way the intellective soul of the human
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person, as genus “rational animal” is an amalgam of nutritive, sensitive, and rational soul, so too
the immaterial information of DNA and Seele-νους is a constituent part of the whole soul. This
reinforces DNA as what Aristotle and Aquinas term the nutritive soul. Plants have it, but
obviously plants and animals lack Seele-νους, insofar as they lack rationality unique to humans
as rational animals. This also reinforces Aquinas in SCG II.76, where he says the agent intellect
is “part” of the soul. It affirms what he says in SCG II.61.3, “And afterwards in the same chapter,
Aristotle remarks that ‘certain parts of the soul are separable.’ But these are no other than
intellective parts. Hence, it remains that these parts are acts of the body.” DNA and Seele-νους is
the µορϕη/νους “split” of the soul that Pasnau speaks of,197 without separating the agent intellect
from the soul –it must be a subsisting part of Paul and Raul’s NID into the resurrection. This
means Seele-νους is a dynamic/accidental criterion for NID. It is anchored to static/essential
DNA, so we can still have continuing NID over time. This means both Merricks and Baker are
answered: NID is not a brute fact, and the duplication problem for an information-bearing or
“memory criterion” model can be avoided.

III. Blueprints, Manuscripts, and Mutations: Objections to DNA
It should be fairly obvious, then, how the DNA modification handles ‘µορϕη schmorphe’.
DNA serves as the µορϕη part, and the νους part is likewise the immaterial ‘data backup’ of
what was dependent upon, but not identical to, the brain while embodied. But what about
blueprints? Corcoran argues against counting DNA as the sole criteria for personhood,
specifically as “all the directions for how the embryo will subsequently develop.”198 He says, “it
is a mistake to reduce personhood to information, which is precisely what a strand of DNA
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contains.”199 Here, it becomes apparent he is describing the sort of inference entailing a person is
identical with their DNA and nothing else –a far cry from the role of DNA as the configured
configurer within a composite as described by Stump/Aquinas. Corcoran even makes a small
argument for a composite, “Moreover, it is worth noting that a strand of DNA itself possesses no
potentialities. An organism (or cell), however, may possess various potentialities in virtue of its
DNA…In the right environment (a cell or organism), it instructs the cell or organism to carry out
particular functions (e.g. to make certain proteins).”200
Corcoran is right to reject reducing Paul’s personal NID to the DNA molecule, but it is
also problematic to disregard it entirely from the equation. As stated above, because DNA is
unique to each person, and is intimately involved in the process of forming the body, and could
survive death as information, it should not be so quickly overlooked. Corcoran goes on to say
“no single organism, let alone a person, exists in the womb just after conception,”201 but this
seems misguided. There are of course a very great number of single or few-celled organisms in
the world, and Corcoran himself states an organism or cell could “possess various potentialities
in virtue of its DNA,” among which, for a fertilized human embryo, no matter how few cells it is
comprised of, would be the form of human personhood.202 While an embryo with a full genome
can claim that status, it would seem illogical, then, to count sperm and eggs as persons under the
same criteria (which Corcoran suggests should follow as a result of any DNA argument). But the
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latent potentiality of a gamete is not the same sort of potentiality in an actually-dividing group of
cells with a completed, unique genetic code. Again, this points to the necessity of the composite:
Paul’s cells, being from a fully grown adult human, could similarly divide with the exact same
DNA he had when he was a fetus. A sperm cell without a full human genome, however, can
never by itself divide and grow to be Paul.
So, Corcoran’s line of reasoning is in doubt, here. To say a ‘blueprint’ is not a thing is an
oversimplification. DNA is an active, teleological blueprint. A blueprint is mere latent
information. DNA is active in-form-ation. It carries within it formal causality in a way a
blueprint or plan does not. When embodied in an embryo, DNA is simultaneously expressing
formal, material, and efficient causality during cell division. That the teleological plan for this
individual human being is contained within the information of one cell is one thing: but that it is
an active process, kick-started, should certainly count for something.203 Finally, Corcoran could
actually get an answer he seeks: DNA, in the sense of the configured configurer described above,
clearly resolves the ambiguity he points out in his version of the objection. Combined with the
‘data backup’ analogy and the admission, above, that a psychological component is necessary (in
Seele-νους), Stump/Aquinas can provide Thomistic disembodied state that makes sense.
Van Inwagen, we recall, has this version of ‘µορϕη schmorphe’, “wouldn’t the union of
my body and the form of my body, whatever the form of my body may be, be simply my body?
And isn’t my body, without qualification, a material substance?”204 While in a certain way the
union of body and soul is simply the body, it is more proper to view it as a union of matter and
form: the form (as DNA) is not the body, but is in the body. In fact, Aquinas says the “soul is in
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each part of the body,”205 and DNA makes this clear. If DNA is understood as the configured
configurer, then it turns out van Inwagen’s intuition, and Stump/Aquinas, are both correct –a true
win-win. In invoking ‘DNA’, I am again not implying the biological structure, but the immaterial
in-form-ation of a genome. It is possible, for example, to download the original genome
sequence from the HGP and store it on a very large computer hard drive. It is therefore possible
to have Paul’s entire human genome printed on a sheet of paper (granted, the paper will be
thousands of miles long, but this fact still obtains). It is also possible, then, for that information
to exist abstractly, as pure information, as backed up data, as εἶδος.
But what about manuscripts? It would seem we have landed right in the middle of van
Inwagen’s famous thought-experiment in “The Possibility of Resurrection,”206 centered on the
token/type distinction: an Augustinian autograph manuscript held by monks in AD 457 is
destroyed by fire. An ‘Aristotelian’207 among the monks claims the manuscript was miraculously
rematerialized by God in AD 458 and is numerically identical to the original. But of course it is
qualitatively distinct even if the information, and even the appearance, is exactly the same.208
Van Inwagen’s point: not even God could reassemble a material object and have it be
numerically the same, and so the resurrection should be understood in the same way. What
makes this manuscript objection so interesting for us is, given DNA/in-form-ation, a person
could even be said to be a manuscript: the line between analogy and reality is blurred.
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For Aquinas, of course, we do not need reassembly of parts, since he already notes we
lose/gain cells here on earth and retain our numerical identity there, i.e. C ≠ ID, and he rejects
reassembly in SCG IV.81.12-13, noted above. Regardless of where the matter comes from, even
if Paul was never composed of it during his life– it can compose his body due to it being
informed or configured by his substantial form, or µορϕη, or soul.209 If Paul does not need
reassembly here on earth to retain his personal NID, then he does not need it for continuity into
the resurrection, either. This is van Inwagen’s point, and also Aquinas’s. But, Paul does need his
substantial form that in-forms his resurrection body to be consistent. Which is the configured
configurer, which is DNA. Stump/Aquinas, modified with DNA, can give us that kind of
consistent, subsistent, substantial form of Paul.
One could further press, along the lines of the manuscript objection, that just as there is a
difference between photocopying a document, or even having the digital representation –or,
perhaps, a ‘data backup’ of it– so, too, would it be the case for NID and DNA: a copy is not the
original. But DNA is different, and this is where the analogy breaks down. Backing up the
information of a genome is not about keeping the autograph original, or even a representation of
the original, where font, text placement, and format might matter for a manuscript to even be
qualitatively identical to the original. It is the information contained therein which makes or
breaks NID for Paul’s DNA. Because DNA is able to replicate itself perfectly through cell
division over myriad iterations –over a normal lifetime, probably too many to count– what we
have in DNA is an autograph copy, over and over again. The information contained in the
physical double helix structure is the manuscript and the autograph. This is a mechanism the
manuscript objection cannot touch: the information is transmitted, encoded, and then put into
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action to replicate and make new cells, accurate well over 99.999% of the time. This is a fact for
DNA, or our bodies, and all living things, would not function.
If we must admit an informational ‘data backup’ of the genome is not numerically the
same as the data of the original biological structure, and therefore insufficient for NID criteria for
the bodily resurrection, then we must also admit every copy of every cell guided by the process
of DNA replication is numerically different than the original DNA. Of course, the cells and even
the actual material copies of the nucleotide bases will be numerically distinct from each other,
but that is not what is at stake. This ‘copy’ objection (note: not van Inwagen’s original,
autograph objection) rests on whether the esse of the document/information (the type) is
sufficient for NID, rather than the token thing itself –the actual AD 457 autograph manuscript in
Augustine’s hand. If the NID of Paul’s DNA rests on being a token and not a type, then cell
replication creating an exact copy of the information would be worthless. However, because of C
≠ ID, the replication of qualitatively distinct cells is sufficient to continue the existence of Paul’s
NID over time. In each cell the DNA structure itself would, of course, be numerically distinct.
But, the same could not be said of the exact same code if it existed as ‘backed up’ immaterial
information. It would be metaphysically simple, no others would be like it, and it would be pure
εἶδος. Therefore, no qualitative distinctions could count against Paul’s ‘backed up’ DNA for NID
over time. This also means DNA during replication, while actively in-forming the composite, is
uniquely both type and token. So, van Inwagen’s manuscript objection, and the ‘copy’ objection,
both fail to set flames to DNA as the criteria for NID over time. We can affirm I Corinthians 15
v.37 and v.42 right along with van Inwagen;210 the remnant preserved for Paul, the γυµνος
κόκκος (bare kernel) will be sown perishable and raised imperishable –and it is Paul’s unique
genome, the information of his DNA. DNA as the vehicle for human teleological in-form-ation
210

van Inwagen, “The Possibility of Resurrection,” 327.

70
can transcend the manuscript or token/type problem: the copies are identical to the originals
exceedingly better than 99.999% of the time, from first cell to final state, from fertilization to
glorification. From zygote to Zion.
But what about mutations? Or cancer? Or other damage to DNA in cells from conditions
in the environment? What about genetic disorders like Cystic Fibrosis, or Sickle Cell disease, or
even color blindness? What about conditions like DiGeorge syndrome (a deletion of a small
piece of chromosome 22), Down syndrome (the presence of all or part of an extra chromosome
21), Turner syndrome (an only-X sex chromosome karotype), or Klinefelter’s syndrome (XXY
sex karotype) –disorders where there is a clear malformation of the genotype, and even the
number and structure of chromosomes, all of which come with serious phenotypical results?
Could we say, for example, based on what has been said so far, that people with these disorders
are even essentially human? Let us say Paul has Down syndrome. Could there be an ideal form
of Paul’s genome awaiting him in the bodily resurrection that would still bear his NID? What
sort of problems does this pose for divine teleology?
At least in regards to mutations, DNA can be measured according to its original structure.
The very idea of a ‘mutation’ infers a perfect original somewhere. If Paul had a melanoma, it is
quite likely that somewhere in his body there still exists at least one cell with the same genome
with which he was born. If we did a full-body scan to determine the genetic code in every cell of
Paul’s body, the vast majority of those cells will have identical DNA. If it were the case that
everyday activities and mutations damage our DNA irreparably for the purposes of NID into the
resurrection, then: 1) cells in the body could not repair their own DNA without possibly
changing the very identity of the person, but cells routinely repair errors and small mutations,
and 2) the human genome could not have been sequenced, which it was, and will continue to be
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even for individual persons in the future. It is seldom the case every single individual cell of the
body has damaged or mutated DNA, so mutations and damages should not be a concern.
Seldom the case, that is: save for the previously mentioned, among many other, genetic
disorders. But perhaps this isn’t such a damaging objection. Let us say Paul has Cystic Fibrosis
(CF) and he commits a heinous crime: he knifes someone to death.211 Paul is also a clumsy
criminal and cuts himself with his own knife in the act, and so leaves many traces of his DNA
behind in the form of his own blood. Luckily for Paul, the police are somewhat slow, and it takes
them a long while to catch up to him –enough time for Paul to have partaken in a recently
developed, total, and miraculous genetic cure of his CF. The police take Paul into custody, and
take a blood or hair sample to verify his DNA matches the DNA found in the blood at the crime
scene. Would they still be able to identify Paul genetically as the murderer? Our intuition says
yes. In fact, due to the volume of genetic material in the human genome, Paul’s DNA would still
be much over 99.999% identical with his CF self, even if scientists were able to track all of the
many scattered genes related to the disorder. The same could be said even of the more serious
karotype-based disorders. If Paul had Down syndrome, he would be identified as Paul without
the extra chromosome 21. If Paulina had Turner syndrome, she would still be Paulina, because
the other 45 chromosomes are numerically identical in data to the pre-cure Paulina. Since they
merely correct corruptions, if cures to genetic diseases do not change the person’s genetic
structure enough to escape being identified with DNA profiling, then perhaps NID can hold into
the resurrection even with slightly more dramatic changes to DNA.
All of the above holds if and only if DNA is static/essential. But if not all of Paul’s DNA
as originally configured when he was a fetus is essential to Paul, does this mean we pick and
choose by convention what parts of the genome are essential and what are accidental to personal
211
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NID? Is there a Sorites paradox of DNA?212 If Paul’s CF can be cured, then could Paul change
his genes for something mundane (like eye color) and still be Paul? If genetic disorders and
diseases are cured in a glorified resurrected body, how is DNA static? How many other so-called
‘accidental’ properties of Paul can be changed genetically before we could say Paul ceases to be
Paul? For our last task, we must try to judiciously determine the essential and accidental
properties of Paul, in order to establish individuation and personal NID into the resurrection.

IV. Phenotypes, Indiscernibility of Identicals, and Individuation
Stump introduces the helpful distinction that resolves the mess, between substantial and
accidental forms.213 A substantial form configures prime matter, brings about a hoc aliquid into
existence that was not already in existence, and affects the kind of change that only results in the
generation of a thing. A substantial form, according to Aquinas, “presupposes only potentiality to
existence, i.e. bare matter.”214 But an accidental form configures an already-existing substance
(and so is, as Aristotle says, like a predicate to a subject), giving a substance a property without
thereby changing its identity. So, Stump concludes, accidental forms are the “non-essential
properties of a thing; the addition or removal of an accidental form does not alter the species to
which the whole belongs or the identity of the whole.” 215 This distinction has broad implications
for individuation of things, especially human persons. Stump argues:
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According to the medieval metaphysics Aquinas accepts, any composite
substance, even an immaterial substance, has accidental forms as well as a
substantial form, and accidental forms a thing can gain or lose while remaining
one and the same thing. Now on a commonsensical view of change over time,
change is a matter of one and the same thing’s having a property at one time
which it lacks at another time. Medieval metaphysics, including Aquinas’s, beings
with a commitment to this commonsensical notion of change and then works to
provide an explanation of something’s remaining numerically one and the same
through the change. Contemporary metaphysics, by contrast, begins with a
commitment to the law of the indiscernability of identicals:
(LII) For any x and y, x is identical to y only if x and y have all and only the same
properties.
On the contemporary commitment to (LII), what needs explaining is change over
time, and it is often explained in ways which are complicated, if not counterintuitive.216
Through a few commonsensical moves, Stump analyzes LII, and affirms something more
comprehensive, given that for Aquinas, matter is what individuates things: “(AP5) For any
substances x and y, x is identical to y only if (i) x has all and only the species-specific properties
that y has, and (ii) x has the property of being constituted by this matter if and only if y has the
property of being constituted by this very same matter.”217 Because of C ≠ ID, (ii) obviously
does not apply to Paul, or any human persons. Therefore only (i) applies. Since accidental
properties (including accidental properties of DNA) are not species-specific (see directly above),
instead of Stump/Aquinas having a Sorites problem with DNA, it is actually contemporary
metaphysicians who accept LII that cannot deal well with accidental properties. The best
example: if (LII) were rigidly held for every property of Paul’s DNA, then the police (if they
were wise on their analytic philosophy) would be forced to let him go if his CF were cured; he
would not be identical to his former self! Stump offers AP5 to show how personal NID can
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survive amid changes from accidental properties. If this more robust understanding of identity
holds, then Stump/Aquinas has no Sorites problem of DNA, and DNA can be perfected in the
bodily resurrection of all kinds of diseases, disorders, and mutations without sacrificing what we
have been after all along: continuity of NID over time.218
The missing connection lies in the distinction between substantial/accidental forms and
the static/dynamic forms in regards to phenotypical differences among genotypes. This is where
the modified Stump/Aquinas model gets cutting edge. Besides Seele-νους being a bearer of
accidental or dynamic properties, I submit that recent work on understanding the epigenome219 is
instructive in understanding the way Aquinas’s concept of ‘accidental form’ works with the
individuation of human persons beside the static or essential nature of DNA. Though defining
the epigenome is a contentious thing in genetic science, Adrian Bird proposes a definition which
supports a more contemporary usage, “the structural adaptation of chromosomal regions so as to
register, signal or perpetuate altered activity states.”220 Epigenetics can at least explain
phenotypical distinctions given genotypical similarity: it reflects the environmental effect on
gene expression, or the “nurture” side of the nature/nurture debate. It is even the case among MZ
twins that there can be epigenetic distinctions,221 which may help to explain how one twin could
be taller than the other, or susceptible to disease in a different way, for example.
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If we think of the epigenome as the dynamic or accidental form partner to DNA’s static
or essential/substantial form, then, for one thing, MZ twins may look exactly the same in the
bodily resurrection. The “nurture” environment being a level playing field, their identical DNA
could phenotypically express itself the exact same way, because their epigenomes, and thus
accidental properties, could be reset. If those accidental properties can change at the resurrection,
it is hard to see why cured genetic disorders could not be treated similarly. Thus, as van Dyke
points out, when Aquinas says in chapter 7 of De ente et essentia that some accidents “come
from” the side of matter and others “come from” the side of form,222 the accidental properties
resulting from the dynamic nature of Seele-νους and the epigenome just might fit.
If DNA is the matching static or essential form to these dynamic or accidental aspects, we
can uphold Paul’s NID into the bodily resurrection, and we can finally make sense of
individuation. Aquinas says “the human soul remains in its own esse when it is separated from
the body, having an aptitude and natural inclination toward union with the body.”223 Aquinas
also upholds the distinction Stump makes between substantial and accidental form, and points it
toward individuation for the resurrection.224 Swinburne’s caveat about Aquinas being unable to
have souls differ in “soul-stuff”225 also dissolves, since it can be the case that souls, as DNA and
Seele-νους, can differ greatly in content, in ways much more nuanced than if the soul were only
νους. Ultimately, for Aquinas, designated matter is the primary individuating principle of human
persons; it has determinate quantitative dimensions, but there are interminate bounds for that
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matter.226 DNA is the formal cause of all of this. For the same metaphysical reason Paul is still
Paul whether standing, sitting, running, losing weight, or losing a hand, or getting poison ivy all
over his face, or getting 80% covered in second and third degree burns, Paul’s accidental
properties in his DNA can change and still be Paul in the bodily resurrection. As Aquinas says,
“Quantitative dimensions are accidents consequent upon corporeity.”227
To conclude, DNA as a modification to Stump/Aquinas serves to 1) preserve the
continuity of the physical body by preserving its specific, person-unique plan, 2) retain a
static/essential aspect of the body in continuity over time, and so partially satisfy what is required
from the good parts of Christian materialism, 3) make better sense of the ‘configured configurer’
of the Stump/Aquinas soul. With Seele-νους, in the midst of the ‘data backup’ we have 1)
something active and conscious; 2) a seat of Paul’s identity that is more than a mere instruction
set, but is his dynamic/accidental self; and 3) something that satisfies RA from the introduction.
But it is ultimately the coupling of DNA and Seele-νους that is most necessary for establishing
Paul’s complete NID over time. The complete statement of what the soul is under this modified
Stump/Aquinas model is both DNA (as genome) and Seele-νους backed-up. Coupling them 1)
avoids duplication problems that Baker points out; 2) solves the mind/soul or ‘µορϕη schmorphe’
problem; 3) resolves most of the other similar metaphysical challenges against the model; 4)
gives us a vision for each individual’s unique divine teleology (both in the DNA and existential
senses), which is ultimately and completely expressed in the bodily resurrection.
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Chapter Five

Conclusion

To get back to the first ‘big question’ from the introduction: the modified Stump/Aquinas
model is friendly to substance dualism thanks to C ≠ ID and the ‘data backup’ providing an
affirmative answer to Plantinga’s question, “Can I exist when my body does not?” The model is
compatible with materialism, as intellect is expressed materially while Paul is embodied (so long
as D ≠ ID is kept in mind). However, Aristotelian causality is required in order to include DNA
in any model of personal NID over time for the bodily resurrection. For, if DNA is the criteria
for NID, dualists and materialists need formal causation (µορϕη). Before they can have µορϕη,
they need Aristotle’s metaphysical causation –but Aristotle did not hold to a bodily resurrection.
So, if they want an account of the bodily resurrection and Aristotle as the prerequisite for µορϕη
and therefore DNA, they need the Stump/Aquinas model, or at least parts of it. This means both
dualists and materialists, to solve the problem of continuity of NID over time into the
resurrection, need to shift around a few ontological categories.
If materialists like Nancey Murphy were to attempt to include DNA without
Stump/Aquinas, they would need to accommodate immaterial information as a criterion for NID.
The requirement is that some immaterial piece of the human person survives death- if a
materialist admits to that at all, they are immediately some form of dualist or another, and would
thus no longer be materialists. If substance dualists like Richard Swinburne were to attempt to
include DNA without Stump/Aquinas, they would need to radically alter their metaphysical
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foundations. Swinburne expertly points out the difference between the way Cartesian dualism
modifies, or abandons, Aristotle and formal causation, as well as the way Aquinas heavily
modifies Aristotle. Swinburne suggests substance dualism is the simpler and therefore more
tenable position. But in order to retain the concept of the hylomorphic relation between
form/soul and matter/body (in order to have DNA as a configurational teleological, in-formational form), the substance dualists would need to regain the Aristotelian metaphysical causality
they threw out in favor of the Cartesian one. If substance dualists were to accept that much of
Aristotle, then how could we say such a system would be appreciably different from the
Stump/Aquinas model? It seems Derek Jefferys was spot-on:
Despite what many contemporary thinkers want to believe, post-modernity and
the rise of modern science have not eliminated the necessity of thinking carefully
about causality. We cannot evade perennial philosophical questions by alleging
that they arise only in a particular categorical framework. Anytime we think
critically about experience, we will have to give some account of the nature of
causality.228
The ultimate importance of this investigation lies in the hope that a mediating view like
the Stump/Aquinas model can “trickle down” from academia to the Christian community atlarge. This would foster more informed and fruitful discussion of the bodily resurrection and the
many theological and ethical issues surrounding it. Thinking through the mind-body problem
helps to make clear the possible virtues and vices that scientific understanding can offer to
theological understanding. With hope, the philosophical insights can make a more robust
awareness of any hermeneutical biases present in the interpretation of Biblical texts relevant to
the issue of personhood. An informed, balanced position between dualism and materialism, such
as the Stump/Aquinas model, would also help to solve the painfully apparent conflict between
Christian philosophers, both dualist and materialist, to seek unity on such an important issue.
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There are some lingering questions, if the Stump/Aquinas model is to satisfy both dualists
and materialists. The implications for determinism from this modified Stump/Aquinas model
should not go ignored. It would be too long of a discussion to address those implications, here.
But if it is the case, as Psalm 139:13 says, that God himself knits us together in the womb, and if
God directly brings together Paul’s unique DNA, then God creates people with genetic diseases
and disorders all for His glory (such as in the case of the man born blind in John 9:1-3) –or else
God cosmically says “whoops” and must react to something seemingly outside of his purview or
control, something that cannot be said to be within the realm of interfering with agent causation
(namely joining a particular egg to a particular sperm). That certainly does not seem to be a freewilled choice any of us could make; even with in vitro fertilization, there is no telling what sort
of genome would result from the chosen gametes. Stump/Aquinas also forces us to ask the same
deterministic question of the teleological processes by which we become who we are
existentially via Seele-νους. One possibility, as a rejoinder to “time-slice” or memory criteria
conceptions of personal identity, is to say our real identity is not fully realized until we are
glorified in the resurrection, and so during this life we can only be said to be “becoming,” and
then sent either to reward or punishment –truly a profound statement of teleology of persons.
Ultimately, though God may not determine every step of man, under the possible existentialteleological implications of Stump/Aquinas, Proverbs 16:9 certainly comes to mind: “The heart
of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps.”
There are other outlying implications obviously not addressed, but germane to the
discussion due to the implications of DNA as a criteria for continuity over time: issues of Jesus
Christ’s unique human personhood; many more questions concerning the intermediate state; the
possibility of the arcane theological view of traducianism, whereby the soul is said to be directly

80
inherited from the parents.229 There are the obvious bioethical implications, including one briefly
touched upon in chapter four: given DNA as active, formally and efficiently causing the material
composite during cell division, there is ensoulment (and thus human life and personhood)
starting directly at conception. This is possibly the most compelling reason to make an effort to
include DNA into any model of philosophical-theological anthropology –other than to show
DNA and science are not threats to Christian thought or to the soul (but are in fact essential to
them). All of these implications, and many more unaddressed, are all excellent points of
discussion that should follow from the issues raised, here.
What about attributing causal powers to the soul?230 Dualists hold the soul reflects,
deliberates, remembers, judges, and has intentions. They hold the soul moves the person, filling
up an insufficient condition for action, up to sufficiency. In short, souls do something. They have
a principle of activity and movement within them. But if the soul were strictly information, then
how is it that information has causal power?
Under this modified Stump/Aquinas model, information has causal powers only when
placed in the proper context. DNA is just the configurational and teleological plan of the material
composite. As the ‘data backup’ analogy shows, the code of a program by itself can do nothing.
It needs the proper devices to output in order to function as intended. The data is still there when
the computer is off, or even if you were to remove the media from the drive or reader, and even
further if you were to place it within another computer. But its functionality is fully realized
when applied appropriately. The same goes with the immaterial information of personhood and
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Swinburne addresses traducianism very briefly in The Evolution of the Soul, 179 and 199. Aquinas, too,
addresses it in SCG II.86-89 and ST 76. It seems, given DNA and Seele-νους, that there is a possibility for some sort
of hybrid view between traducianism and creationism for this modified Stump/Aquinas model –something to which
an entirely separate thesis could be devoted.
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the physical body. The Stump/Aquinas soul does have causal powers, they are just kept distinct
from the soul.231 Eberl puts it this way:
I am being composed of an organic body that is suitably organized to support my
activities of living, sensing, moving, and thinking. Most of my activities are
wholly realized within the organic structure of my body, for example, moving,
breathing, and seeing. My conscious mental functions, however, are not wholly
realized within my cerebral cortex; nevertheless, the functioning of my cerebral
cortex supports them.232
As DNA, the soul has formal causation in configuring the material composite, including the
brain, into the individuated person that Paul is. Formal causation blurs right into final causation,
and understood teleologically, this soul definitely does something. Likewise, the Seele-νους has
causal powers, just not alone: a brain and central nervous system is required, but because of D ≠
ID, Seele-νους is not contingent upon the brain for existence. While embodied, Seele-νους is an
emergent property of the brain, and can be referred to as ‘soul’ with no harm done. While
disembodied or ‘backed up’, Seele-νους is sustained in existence and kept conscious and
ontologically distinct by God’s supernatural act. The soul’s cause of the body is formal, but
efficient causation is in the composite. Causal connections are kept intact, and under the
modified Stump/Aquinas model, especially as DNA/configured configurer, the soul does a lot.
The second ‘big question’ from the introduction seems to be the more important one:
“Does the Stump/Aquinas model overcome the many metaphysical challenges surrounding
numerical identity and the bodily resurrection?” I hope, over the course of the previous three
chapters, in the midst of all of the objections and caveats and possibilities, I have shown the
answer to this question to be a satisfactory “yes.”
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Pasnau lays out the intricacies for that move, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 162-3. This is also why over
half of Aristotle’s De Anima, much of Aquinas’s treatise in ST Ia.75-89, and even a large portion of Swinburne’s
The Evolution of the Soul is about the soul’s causal powers: but I hardly have the space to address it.
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Eberl, “Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings,” 362.
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In order to better summarize, it seems appropriate to end by witnessing Paul’s death and
resurrection, as understood by the modified Stump/Aquinas model. Let us say poor Paul has just
suffered cardiac arrest. His heart has stopped, and soon (if not right away) we could declare him
to be clinically dead. The material composite of Paul is no longer animated,233 and yet he has not
ceased to be (he is not an ex-humanae personae). Upon his death, his material body is in-formed
by a different substantial form, now: DNA no longer being active, and Seele-νους no longer
being efficiently caused by the brain, the dead body that was once the composite of Paul is no
longer a human person. Paul’s DNA and Seele-νους, however, has been immaterially ‘backedup’. Because of RA, C ≠ ID, and the ramifications they have upon the Stump/Aquinas
intermediate sate, Paul exists when his body does not. To ask certain interrogative questions of
Paul’s soul (where, when) is akin to asking the same questions of an idea, or εἶδος, and it won’t
make any sense. We can, however, ask certain others (who, what, why). Paul is still Paul in this
state, because of the Seele-νους being backed up (possible because of RA and D ≠ ID). Paul is
still a person (“an individual substance with a rational nature” according to Boethius), although
he is not a complete human person, and so is in a deficient state of existence. But, Paul’s
233

Regarding whether the soul is responsible for literal movement and animation of the body as a dualist would
say, a quick thought experiment: When Paul’s heart stops, there are at least three options at our disposal to try and
bring Paul back: CPR, and if CPR works, a portable defibrillator to steady his heart rate, or (if available) a syringe of
adrenaline to be dramatically injected directly into his heart. Let us assume CPR successfully restarts Paul’s heart.
Here is the big question: what changed about Paul? Is he somehow different substantially, and if so, in what sense?
Does this act of reanimation (in the sense described above) have something to do with the soul? It seems on to have
everything to do with the body, whether by forcing oxygen through the circulatory system via the heart and lungs, or
jolting electricity through his body. We can, if we want, struggle with the dualist to explain how the soul
superintends this phenomenon. But the result, that CPR must somehow literally infuse the soul back into the body so
it can be reanimated, is absurd. Does the Stump/Aquinas model do better? If different causal connections and body
systems are properties of the material composite, but are still caused (at least formally) by the soul, we can agree
with Aquinas that animation, akin to sense perception, is likewise a property of the material composite, or Paul
proper, and also of his soul in a restricted sense. The chain of causality from DNA as the configuring formal cause
to the processes below seems to be a better option than what the substance dualist is forced to say. But DNA is the
direct efficient cause of cell division and making specified cell types, which causes organs to be formed, which
causes bodily systems, and in effect causes all of the properties (neural, sensitive, nutritive, etc) of the material
composite. So, under Stump/Aquinas, does the soul cause animation of the composite? Yes: formally, and efficiently
via indirect causal chains. We can say the soul (truly, the anima) causes animation of the body, but we are still able
to say the defibrillator’s electricity to the heart, or the motion of one’s fist into the chest of a flatlined Paul, brings
about the efficient cause of his body’s animation and motion: be it electricity, or the breath of life.
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existence (both in the purely factual sense and in the existential sense) is upheld by God’s
supernatural action –for the very purpose of providing continuity of Paul’s personal numerical
identity over time into the bodily resurrection.
The real “why” of all of this, though, is Paul’s complete expression, divinely designed, in
the resurrection. Paul’s DNA (as immaterial data, his backed-up genome) in-forms the new cells
of his resurrection body, in a way similar to how it in-formed his very first cell as a zygote. It
could be the case that all of the cells are reconstituted at the same time –as it is by no means
necessary for Paul’s body to be brought about cell-by-cell in this way. Paul’s body will be
perfect, in a few senses. It will be in the best possible condition it could be. It will be, as Paul
says in I Corinthians 15, “imperishable” or “incorruptible.” Paul’s as his Seele-νους, which
throughout the process of being backed-up was conscious (whether it was instantaneous or if he
experienced a passage of time) is now properly an emergent property of his material resurrected
body; his brain is the efficient cause of his Seele-νους, once again. Paul, in this resurrected state,
is exactly what God created him to be. The limits of imagination cannot begin to describe how
great and awesome the experience is. The limits of philosophical and theological speculation
cannot begin to touch the implications for what this all means for Paul’s existential self in the
Seele-νους –although that is admittedly the most interesting question to ask, perhaps for another
research project. But, certainly, Paul is embodied, and his numerical identity continues over time.
He is resurrected.
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